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CODE, CRASH, AND OPEN SOURCE: THE
OUTSOURCING OF FINANCIAL REGULATION TO RISK
MODELS AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
Erik F. Gerding*
Abstract: The widespread use of computer-based risk models in the financial industry
during the last two decades enabled the marketing of more complex financial products to
consumers, the growth of securitization and derivatives, and the development of
sophisticated risk-management strategies by financial institutions. Over this same period,
regulators increasingly delegated or outsourced vast responsibility for regulating risk in both
consumer finance and financial markets to these privately owned industry models.
Proprietary risk models of financial institutions thus came to serve as a “new financial code”
that regulated transfers of risk among consumers, financial institutions, and investors.
The spectacular failure of financial-industry risk models in the current worldwide
financial crisis underscores the dangers of regulatory outsourcing to the new financial code.
This Article explains how financial institutions used the “new financial code” to shift,
spread, and price financial risk using the template of the stages of securitization of consumercredit products, hedging through credit default swaps, and overall portfolio management.
This Article then examines several explanations for the failures of risk models, which
contributed to the current crisis, including flaws in the design of risk models and agency
costs associated with those models. It also outlines several lessons for regulatory outsourcing
from the current crisis, including the following:
•

Bank regulators should scrap those provisions of Basel II that allow certain
banks to set their own capital requirements according to their internal risk
models;

•

Regulators should promote “open source” in code (or the models) used to
market financial products to consumers, price securitizations and derivatives,
and manage financial-institution risk; and

•

The failure of risk models used to price securitizations and derivatives reveals
some of the comparative advantages of equity securities in spreading risk.
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INTRODUCTION
The revolution in quantitative finance that occurred over the last two
decades produced models that enabled the rapid growth of securitization
and derivatives.1 This Article demonstrates that financial regulators
delegated or outsourced to these computer-based risk models the
responsibility of regulating a wide range of risk transfers in the
economy—from consumer finance to global financial markets. These
risk models failed spectacularly in the global financial crisis that started
in the subprime mortgage market, and this outsourcing of regulation
exacerbated the crisis.
1. Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency
Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231 (2008) (describing how advances in
quantitative finance have led to the development of sophisticated derivatives and other financial
products that promise both to lead to “complete” capital markets and drain liquidity from equity
markets).
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To understand the crisis, the failure of risk models, and the dangers of
regulatory outsourcing, it is helpful to sketch out the system by which
mortgages are connected to asset-backed securities, derivatives, and
financial risk to global financial institutions.2 Securitization uses the
future payment streams from mortgages and other credit products to
create securities that are sold to investors. These investors not only
acquire the right to these payment streams, but also assume a portion of
the financial risk that borrowers will not make payment on the
underlying mortgages when due; securitization thus carves up the risk
associated with mortgages and other securitized assets into slices, which
are then spread among investors.3 Those investors could then use credit
derivatives and other derivatives to offload parts of this risk to
counterparties in exchange for paying premiums to those counterparties.4
Securitization and derivatives created a system for transferring risk
and spreading it among those investors who could theoretically bear risk
most efficiently.5 Each part of this risk-transfer system was enabled by
private, computer-based industry risk models that were built using
innovations in quantitative finance. These models include the following:
• Data-mining and credit-scoring software used by financial
institutions to market mortgages, loans and other financial
products to individual consumers (this marketing includes not
only setting the price of those products to match the risk of
individual borrowers, but also creating complex features in
those products that can be tailored for certain categories of
consumers);6
• Pricing models used by financial institutions to structure and
price the securitization of those consumer financial products;7
• Models used by credit-rating agencies to assign ratings to the
asset-backed securities issued in securitizations;8
2. This system is described in detail in Part I.B infra.
3. The mechanics of securitization are described in greater detail in Part I.B.ii infra.
4. For an analysis of derivative transactions, see Part I.B.iv infra.
5. See Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 1, at 263.
6. Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: the Problem of Predatory
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 719–21, 724–26 (2006) (analyzing how advances in financial
industry data collection technology allow lenders to market highly complex financial products to
consumers and gain an information advantage over consumers with respect to predicting consumer
defaults and penalties under those products). Use of code at the level of consumer finance is
examined further in Part I.B.i.
7. See infra Part I.B.ii.
8. See infra Part I.B.iii.1.
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•

Models used to price those derivatives that further hedge the
risks of asset-backed securities;9 and
• Models used by financial institutions to manage their
investment portfolios and set their overall risk-management
policies.10
This Article refers to the above-mentioned data-mining software and
computer-based risk models as the “new financial code.” As the new
financial code proliferated, regulators outsourced to it significant
responsibility for regulating financial markets. Regulatory outsourcing
occurs at each point in the financial system in which computer-based
risk models are used, including in the following areas:
• Regulators have permitted lenders to use sophisticated datamining and credit-scoring software to tailor and market
increasingly complex mortgages and other credit products to
consumers, and particularly to those consumers least able to
navigate that complexity.11
• Regulators have outsourced oversight of the risk transfer in
the securitization of financial products to rating agencies
indirectly via regulations that govern the principle investors
who purchase asset-backed securities. Numerous financial
regulations restrict investments by banks and certain other
institutional investors to “investment-grade” debt. These
regulations delegate regulation of the risk-taking by these
institutions to rating agencies that determine which securities
qualify as “investment grade.”12

9. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1019, 1020–22, 1029–30 (2007) (analyzing two of these devices—credit default swaps and
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)—and emphasizing the importance of mathematical models
for CDOs). For an earlier article analyzing use of code in constructing derivatives, see Henry T.C.
Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: the Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory
Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1476–81 (1993). Use of code in hedging, including in pricing
derivatives, is explored in Part I.B.iii.4 infra.
10. Raj Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory and the FICAS Model: a Case Study of Capital
Adequacy and Currency Trading, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 125, 159–62, 178, 183–87 (1997) (detailing
arguments for superiority of banks’ internal models to measure risk and set capital requirements
compared to regulatory methods). Use of code for these purposes is discussed in Part I.B.iii.3 infra.
11. See infra Part I.B.i.
12. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 681 (1999) (characterizing regulations that limit
financial institutions to investments that are rated by rating agencies as giving those rating agencies
a “regulatory license”).
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Under the Basel II Accord,13 certain large banks received
authority from regulators to set their capital requirements
using the banks’ proprietary risk models.14 The new accord
also permits banks to set capital requirements using rating
agency ratings as a critical determinant.15
In 2004, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) followed the Basel II model by allowing certain large
U.S. financial conglomerates to set their required regulatory
capital according to their own proprietary risk models.16
Regulators have resisted calls to regulate complex over-thecounter (OTC) credit derivatives, which financial institutions
have used to hedge risks from securitizations and financial

13. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (June 2006)
[hereinafter “Basel II”], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf, permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n13.pdf.
Basel II is the second accord among bank regulators and central bankers from countries that
belong to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (members come from the so-called “Group
of Ten” countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The accord consists of a series of
recommended bank regulations and principles that national regulators should implement in their
home countries. The accord thus attempts to set minimum international banking standards to
mitigate both regulatory arbitrage by international banks and financial risks caused by potential
bank failure that could spread from one economy to another. For a capsule summary of the Basel
accords, see Robert Hugi et al., U.S. Adoption of Basel II and the Basel II Securitization
Framework, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 45 (2008); Eric Y. Wu, Basel II: a Revised Framework, 24
ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 150 (2005).
Although non-binding, national regulators exert pressure on one another to comply with the
accord, giving it the quality of “soft law.” See Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global
Administrative Law: the View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 17 (2006) (reciting critiques of
law-making by networks of bank regulators and international bureaucrats in the Basel Accord as
lacking accountability and legitimacy, but arguing that Basel II is subject to a subtle structure of
international administrative law); Dieter Kerwer, Rules that Many Use: Standards and Global
Regulation, 18 GOVERNANCE 611 (2005).
14. Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern International Financial Regulation:
Increasing Reliance on a Public-Private Partnership, 37 INT’L LAW 43, 46 (2003).
15. BASEL II, supra note 13, at 19 (permitting banks to set regulatory capital for credit risk in part
based on rating agency ratings (i.e., “external credit assessment)). See also id. at 27 (establishing the
requirements that specify when banks can use “external credit assessment” to support capitalrequirement assessments for credit risk).
The principle U.S. banking regulators have already issued a final rule setting out the framework
for Basel II implementation in the United States. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital
Adequacy Framework – Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 559, 560, 563, 567).
16. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49,830, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 21, 2004)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200 and 240).
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risk generally.17
• In addition, regulators have been reluctant to regulate hedge
funds, which comprise a significant number of the
counterparties to OTC derivatives.18 Even preliminary
attempts at regulating hedge funds19 were thwarted in the face
of the terrible complexity of these funds and uncertainty as to
the scope of risk that they posed.20
By outsourcing, financial regulators placed great faith in the new

17. See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the
Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 704–07 (1999) (noting that OTC market is largely
unregulated, but describing debate on regulation in context of proposed Commodity Exchange Act
amendments).
Then-Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan expressed concern about how over-regulation
of OTC derivatives might impair market efficiency and threaten U.S. competitiveness. Working
Group Report on OTC Derivatives: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and
Forestry, 106th Cong. (Feb. 10, 2000) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System), available at http://agriculture.senate.gov/Hearings/
Hearings_2000/wl00210/0029gre.htm, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.
edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n17.pdf.
His position meshed with views among other policymakers and scholars that light regulation was
justified given a “set of private mechanisms that facilitate smooth functioning OTC derivatives
markets.” GARRY J. SCHINASI, SAFEGUARDING FINANCIAL STABILITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 206
(2006) (“Market discipline, provided by shareholders and creditors, promotes market stability by
rewarding financial institutions based on their performance and creditworthiness.”) But, Mr.
Schinasi also notes, “Recent research finds market discipline to be strong only during periods of
banking sector stress and volatile financial markets.” Id.
18. Dustin G. Hall, Note, The Elephant in the Room: Dangers of Hedge Funds in Our Financial
Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 221–26 (2008) (criticizing proposals to regulate hedge funds as too
modest). But cf. Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: the SEC’s Regulatory
Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 977 (2006) (describing possible rationale
behind SEC attempt to require registration of hedge funds). The proposed SEC regulation
(discussed infra note 19) was opposed by Alan Greenspan, who favors leaving hedge funds
unregulated. DIMITRIS N. CHORAFAS, STRESS TESTING FOR RISK CONTROL UNDER BASEL II 299
(2006) (describing letter Greenspan sent to Congress opposing SEC regulation); ALAN GREENSPAN,
THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW WORLD 370 (2007) (arguing that hedge funds
are sufficiently regulated by “market surveillance”).
19. In one notable example, the Securities and Exchange Commission passed regulations
requiring certain hedge funds to register with the Commission. Registration under the Advisers Act
of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2,333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,05401 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279 (2005)), invalidated by Goldstein v. SEC,
451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
20. The SEC’s hedge-fund registration rule prompted a sharp dissent from two SEC
commissioners who argued that the benefits of registration paled in comparison to the costs the rule
imposed on hedge funds. Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2,333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,089 (dissent of Commissioners
Glassman and Atkins). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ultimately struck down the
SEC rule on statutory interpretation grounds. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 884.
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technology of financial institutions to police the transfers of risk made
via complex financial products.21 Regulators were both daunted by the
complexity posed by new financial instruments and awed by the promise
of new financial engineering to shift and spread risk efficiently.
But the financial crisis that began in the subprime mortgage market
belied this promise, as risk models failed to anticipate a wave of defaults
on consumer mortgages that led to losses on mortgage-backed securities.
Massive foreclosures in residential real estate and widespread failures of
major financial institutions provide stark evidence of the failure of the
new financial code to regulate risk.
Before this Article begins to examine the rise and crash of the new
financial code, it is useful to examine briefly a parallel in an altogether
different area of legal scholarship to provide context for the problem of
the new financial code and suggest possible solutions. The way in which
financial institutions came to regulate a large part of financial markets
resembles, in several important ways, how proprietary software has
come to regulate the internet. In 1999, cyberlaw scholar Lawrence
Lessig described how the private sector created software that establishes
the “architecture” of the world-wide web, and how this software
functions as a kind of private regulation.22 According to Lessig, this
software enables private firms (and ultimately governments) to track and
regulate the behavior of individuals who use the internet.23 Yet internet
users little suspect the ways in which computer codes constrain them.24
21. See generally Bhala, supra note 10. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan typified the
optimism for the new financial code. He lauded the benefits of code for the consumer credit market:
With these advances in technology, lenders have taken advantage of credit-scoring models and
other techniques for efficiently extending credit to a broader spectrum of consumers. . . .
Where once more-marginal applicants would simply have been denied credit, lenders are now
able to quite efficiently judge the risk posed by individual applicants and to price that risk
appropriately. These improvements have led to rapid growth in subprime mortgage lending.
Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the Federal Reserve System’s Fourth Annual Community Affairs
Research Conference (Apr. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Greenspan Apr. 8, 2005 Remarks], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050408/default.htm, permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n21a.pdf.
Two years earlier, Greenspan touted the ability of these same risk models combined with loan
securitization to increase market efficiency and to open “doors to national credit markets for both
consumers and businesses.” Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the JumpStart Coalition’s Annual Meeting
(Apr. 3, 2003), available at https://www.jumpstartcoalition.org/fileuptemp/GreenspanRemarks.htm,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n21b.pdf.
22. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
23. Id. at 41–53.
24. Id. at 4–8. The architecture of the internet also facilitates government regulation of the web,
which threatens to constrain free speech, id. at 164–85, intrude on privacy, id. at 142–63, and
consolidate industry ownership of intellectual property, id. at 122–41.

134

AUTHOR_FINAL_EDITS_GERDING_5-22-09B.DOC

6/7/2009 6:51 PM

Code, Crash, and Open Source
Because this regulation is embedded within a complex technology, it
escaped scrutiny by policymakers until examined by Lessig and other
cyberlaw scholars. For the same reason, the new financial code also long
escaped detailed scrutiny and criticism.
One of Lessig’s recommendations for exposing the darker side of the
regulatory potential for internet code is to promote open source in
software.25 This Article argues that the same approach should be applied
to remedy the failures of the new financial code. It argues for greater
disclosure of the algorithms and internal workings of the codes used to
market financial products to consumers, price asset-backed securities
and derivatives, and set risk-management policies at financial
institutions. This increased transparency will allow these various codes
to be examined by the marketplace and the wider public, improving the
ability of codes to regulate transfers of risk. Greater transparency would
also allow the public to examine consumer-lending practices and to root
out invasions of privacy and predatory or discriminatory lending.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines both how the rise of
risk models enabled the growth of securitization in the last two decades
and how financial regulators increasingly outsourced regulatory
responsibility to these industry models. Part I then sketches how the
current financial crisis spread, demonstrating the failure of these models.
It also draws historical parallels from the failure of risk models in the
current crisis to both the 1987 stock-market crash and the failure of the
Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund in 1998. Part II examines
some of the explanations for the spectacular failures of risk models in
the current financial crisis. Part III investigates several policy
implications of these failures, and argues that bank regulators should
abandon those provisions of the Basel II Accord that allow large banks
to set their own regulatory capital according to their internal risk models.
It also argues that regulators should promote open source in the
proprietary models used to market consumer financial products, price
securitizations, and manage financial institution risk. Lastly, Part III
responds to a recent article by Professors Gilson and Whitehead noting
the decline of equity markets at the expense of complex financial
instruments made possible by complex risk models.26

25. Id. at 100.
26. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 1.
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THE RISE OF THE NEW FINANCIAL CODE AND ITS CRASH

Part I details the rise of financial institution risk models in the last two
decades and provides a snapshot of how these models failed in the
ongoing global financial crisis. Part I.A begins with a short summary of
different forms of financial risk and then explains how developments in
quantitative finance led to new computer-based models that could
estimate and price these different forms of risk.
Part I.B then explains how these computer-based models enabled the
development of new financial products that broke risk into pieces that
could be transferred and spread to investors in financial markets. Part I.B
uses the following chain of securitization and hedging as an
organizational template: (i) the marketing of mortgages (and other credit
products) to consumers; (ii) the securitization of these mortgages,
creating mortgage-backed securities; (iii) the decision by banks and
other institutions to purchase mortgage-backed securities and other
asset-backed securities; and (iv) the use of derivatives to hedge risks
from asset-backed securities. At each link of this chain, Part I.B
demonstrates both how financial institutions use computer-based models
to price and manage risk, and how regulators outsourced regulatory
responsibility to these models for overseeing massive transfers of risk.
Part I.C provides a brief snapshot of how the financial crisis began
and how it revealed the failure of industry risk models to anticipate or
price financial risk. Part I.D then draws parallels between these failures
of the new financial code and factors that contributed to the 1987 crash
of the U.S. stock market and the 1998 failure of the Long-Term Capital
Management hedge fund.
A.

A Primer on Financial Risk

i.

Typology of Risk

One of the principal uses of the new financial code is to help financial
institutions manage risk and price financial products given expected risk.
Therefore, it is important to first lay out a typology of different financial
risks that the new financial code attempts to model. Financial risk means
most basically the possibility of losing money due to an event.27 Risk

27. Cf. JOËL BESSIS, RISK MANAGEMENT IN BANKING 11–12 (2d ed. 2002) (analyzing risks faced
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models attempt to quantify the probability and extent of a loss.28
As detailed in Part I.A.ii infra, risk models make various assumptions
in attempting to quantify these probabilities and often use historic loss
data to model future losses. But attempts to quantify these probabilities
are inherently problematic because future losses may not follow historic
patterns. This highlights an important distinction that economists have
drawn between “risk” (when the probabilities of future loss are known—
for example, when playing a game of dice) and “uncertainty” (when
probabilities of future loss are not known).29 The question then becomes
how well historic data can predict future losses, or, more generally, how
effectively measurements of “risk” serve as a proxy for quantifying
“uncertainty.”
This distinction between risk and uncertainty aside, the architects of
these models make meaningful predictions by breaking financial risk
into categories based on the source of potential loss.30 Two of the most
basic forms of risk that financial institutions attempt to model and
quantify are credit risk and market risk, which are defined as follows:
Credit risk: For a financial institution, credit risk is the risk that a
borrower will default on payment of obligations to that institution.31
Credit risk includes counterparty risk in derivative transactions, i.e., the
risk that a counterparty which has contractual obligations to make
payment to an institution (upon an event specified in the derivative
contract) will not perform those obligations.32
Market risk: Market risk, on the other hand, covers risks that the
value of a firm’s investments or other assets will decline (or that its

by banks and defining risk as “uncertainties resulting in adverse variations of profitability or in
losses”); NEIL CROCKFORD, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT 5–6 (2d ed. 1986).
28. BESSIS, supra note 27, at xi.
29. This key distinction was first made by economist Frank Knight over seventy-five years ago,
in FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). See Craig S. Lerner & Moin A.
Yahya, “Left Behind” After Sarbanes Oxley, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1383, 1392 (2007) (noting that
Knight created this distinction).
30. BESSIS, supra note 27, at 12.
31. Id. at 13. Bessis notes that credit risk also covers the decline in the credit standing of an
obligor, or bonds or stock held by the institution even short of default, as this decline “triggers an
upward move of the required market yield to compensate [for] the higher risk and triggers a value
decline” of the security. Id.
32. Id. at 499–504 (discussing credit risk in the context of derivatives). For an economic analysis
of the effects of counterparty risk on the pricing of derivatives and other complex financial
instruments, see generally Robert A. Jarrow & Fan Yu, Counterparty Risk and the Pricing of
Defaultable Securities, 56 J. FIN. 1765 (2002).
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liabilities will increase) due to changes in market prices.33 Because a
firm’s investment portfolio may be subject to price fluctuations in
different types of markets, market risk includes several different
subcategories of risk, including: (1) interest rate risk, or the risk
exposure from changes in interest rates;34 and (2) equity risk, or risk
arising from fluctuations in stock returns.35
As detailed in Part I.A.ii infra, quantitative finance has created
sophisticated means of modeling all of the above forms of risk. Other
important categories of risk, such as operational, liquidity, and systemic
risk, prove harder to quantify as they are less directly reflected by
historical market data. These forms of risk are defined as follows:
Operational risk: Operational risk is a broad term that conveys risk
posed by a firm’s operations. The Basel II Accord defines operational
risk as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal
processes, people and systems or from external events.”36 Operational
risk thus covers everything from potential losses caused by employee
mistake or fraud, to losses from hurricanes.
Liquidity risk: Liquidity risk also proves difficult to model with
market data, as it occurs when markets seize up. This risk takes two
forms. Trading-liquidity risk (also called market liquidity risk) is the risk
that a firm cannot find a counterparty in the market willing to buy or sell
the asset at fair market value.37 Funding-liquidity risk means “the risk
that [a] firm will not be able to meet efficiently both expected and
unexpected current and future cash flow and collateral needs without
affecting either daily operations or the financial condition of the firm.”38
Systemic risk: Systemic risk arises from a broader market failure; this

33. HENNIE VAN GREUNING & SONJA BRAJOVIC BRATANOVIC, ANALYZING AND MANAGING
BANKING RISK: FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL RISK 111
(2003).
34. BESSIS, supra note 27, at 17.
35. ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION 60 (2002) (discussing measurement of
equity risk through equity-risk premiums).
36. BASEL II, supra note 13, at 144, ¶ 644.
37. This raises the question of what constitutes “fair market value.” There are other variations on
the definition of “trading-liquidity risk” or “market-liquidity risk” that have their own ambiguities.
According to the Bank for International Settlements, market-liquidity risk occurs when “a firm
cannot easily offset or eliminate a position at the market price because of inadequate market depth
or market disruption.” BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND
LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION 1 n.2 (June 2008).
38. Id.
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form of risk denotes potential losses that affect the entire market,39 and
which thus cannot be mitigated through diversification.40 These systemic
losses may begin with an external shock that disrupts entire financial
markets, or with a chain reaction in which one financial institution fails,
causing its creditors to fail as well.41 Systemic risk represents a prime
concern of financial regulators, due to its enormous repercussions and
the inability of any individual financial institution to mitigate this form
of risk through diversification.42
Other forms of risk: Financial institutions also must manage other
forms of specialized risk, including concentration risk (potential losses
to a lender due to a high percentage of its total loans concentrated in a
small number of debtors),43 and reputation risk (potential losses
stemming from a decline in public opinion of the institution).44
Reputation risk also encompasses the potential threat of bank runs,
which occur when depositors withdraw funds due to an institution’s
deterioration in creditworthiness, whether actual or perceived (or even
the perceived deterioration of the financial health of other firms).45
ii.

The Revolution in Quantitative Finance

The capacity (however limited) of models to measure risk in a
sophisticated way stems from the revolution in quantitative finance over
the past two decades. This revolution began with the widespread use of

39. Systemic risk has been defined as “the risk of a breakdown in an entire system, as opposed to
breakdowns in individual parts or components.” George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What is
Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It, 7 INDEP. REV. 371, 371 (2003);
see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008).
40. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 142 (2006)
(discussing how arbitrageurs cannot diversify away systemic risk).
41. Kaufman & Scott, supra note 39, at 372–73.
42. See Schwarcz, supra note 39, at 200–02. Professor Schwarcz argues that not only do financial
institutions lack the capacity to deal with systemic risk individually (because of an inability to
diversify away the risk), but that they also lack incentives due to collective action failure; no one
firm can capture all the of the benefit of an action it takes to reduce systemic risk. Id.
43. FRANK J. FABOZZI, BOND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 491 (2001).
44. See Konrad S. Alt, Managing Reputation Risk, RMA J., Sept. 2002, at 40–41.
45. Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks, Securities
Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL 15, 19–20 (Hal S. Scott
ed., 2005). Even non-banks may experience the modern equivalent of a bank run when other firms
that have extended credit to them make margin calls. Bhagwan Chowdhry & Vikram Nanda,
Leverage and Market Stability: The Role of Margin Rules and Price Limits, 71 J. BUS. 179, 182
(1998) (analyzing the potential destabilizing effects of margin calls).
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the Black-Scholes model for pricing options.46 This model, when
combined with incredible increases in computing power, enabled
specialists in the new field of quantitative finance to build sophisticated
pricing and risk models. These models could churn volumes of market
data into nuanced forecasts of expected losses (and returns).47 The
following paragraphs detail some of the basic risk-modeling tools
developed during this revolution.
Value-at Risk: Value-at-risk is a method used to determine potential
losses from a given form of risk. One option for measuring potential
losses is to determine the maximum possible loss. This is not a useful
yardstick, however, because while the maximum loss might be
enormous (e.g., 100% of the value of an asset), the probability of that
loss occurring might be negligible. By contrast, value-at-risk provides a
measure of both the extent and probability of losses occurring.48 Simply
stated, value-at-risk describes the maximum possible loss over a
specified time period with a given level of confidence.49 For example, a
value-at-risk determination of a maximum of $1,000,000 of losses over a
two-week period with a 95% confidence interval translates into a 5%
probability that losses will exceed $1,000,000 over those two weeks. But
value-at-risk numbers say nothing about the magnitude of losses above
that confidence interval.50 In the above example, there is a 5% chance of
losses exceeding $1,000,000, but the value-at-risk measurement does not
specify how large those losses may be.
Diagram A depicts a value-at-risk calculation for the foregoing
example. The curve depicts expected losses (or gains) on a portfolio with
the probability of losses (or gains) on the vertical axis and the magnitude
of losses (or gains) on the horizontal axis. The shaded area represents
5% of the area under the curve and is therefore equivalent to 5% of
potential losses. Point x, or $1,000,000, then represents the maximum
possible loss with a 95% confidence interval (i.e., there is only a 5%
(100% minus 95%) chance that losses will exceed that amount).

46. DONALD R. VAN DEVENTER ET AL., ADVANCED FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 9 (2005).
47. Id. at 8–10.
48. BESSIS, supra note 27, at 12.
49. Id.
50. See id.
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Diagram A
To calculate value-at-risk, modelers must assume the basic
distribution of losses, i.e., they must determine the shape of the curve in
the preceding diagram. They have three options. First, they can assume
that losses fall in a “normal” distribution—in other words, that they
follow a bell-curve shape. This assumption may have no basis in reality.
Therefore, modelers can take a second approach of using historical data
to determine the distribution of losses. This approach has downsides as
well; historical data chosen may suffer from sample bias. For example,
modelers may not have looked far enough back in time to gather data,
and may miss important historical events in which massive losses were
incurred. Inputting more historical data would ameliorate this, but
financial markets do not always follow historical patterns.51
In order to form loss distributions, modelers can also employ a third
technique—Monte Carlo simulations—which estimates financial losses
using sophisticated random sampling driven by advanced computing
power. This random sampling proves particularly valuable when several
different variables can interact to produce financial loss, i.e., if the
51. Darrel Duffie & Jun Pan, An Overview of Value at Risk, 4 J. DERIVATIVES 7, 19–20 (1997).
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equation used to calculate losses has multiple variables. But even this
sophisticated technique requires that modelers make assumptions about
the relationship among these different variables in real-world markets—
they must write the equation that transforms the several variables into
financial loss. Modelers can assume that this relationship will follow
historical patterns (use historical data), which leads back to the problem
of whether the historical data selected provide an adequate sample.
Modelers could also develop their own algorithm or equations for the
relationship, but this in turn leads to the issue of the accuracy of the
assumptions behind the algorithm.52
In other words, assumptions in modeling are inescapable, and the
strength of a model depends on how well the assumptions match the
future behavior of markets. Even the technological wizardry of Monte
Carlo simulations cannot transmute uncertainty into risk.
One particular problem faced by value-at-risk models is “fat tails,” or
potential large-magnitude, low-probability losses. This phenomenon is
so named because the ends of a loss distribution curve, where
probabilities are low, have a higher, or “fatter,” magnitude of loss.
Diagram B provides a contrast between a normal-shaped distribution of
losses (line x) and a distribution of losses with a fat-tail (line y). The
left-hand edge of line y represents low-probability but high-loss events,
which are often compared to “hundred year storms.”

52. BESSIS, supra note 27, at 608–21.
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Diagram B
Modelers have several options for dealing with potential fat tails.
They can “stress test” the models. Stress testing involves changing
model assumptions, such as confidence level or the period of time
measured, to see if value-at-risk determinations change.53 Stress tests
often involve generating worst-case scenarios. Modelers can also judge
model performance through “back testing.” This involves modelers
making several hypothetical jumps back in time, inputting historical data
that were available at those respective times, and then comparing the
predictions of the model with how losses actually unfolded.54
B.

Code Along the Nodes of the Financial Web: The Stages of
Securitization

These and other risk-modeling tools developed during the revolution
in quantitative finance, when combined with the increases in computing
power, enabled financial institutions to develop complex new financial
products, including the mortgage-backed securities that lie at the heart of
53. Id. at 411–12. Extreme Value Theory represents one mathematically sophisticated version of
stress testing for fat tails, but this tool still relies on assumptions to model uncertainty in terms of
risk. Id. at 78, 411.
54. Id. at 411.
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the recent subprime crisis. The sections below track the rise of code
using the template of mortgage origination, followed by securitization,
followed by hedging and risk management in the wake of securitization.
i.

Marketing Financial Products to Consumers

The securitization process begins with “origination,” when a lender
extends credit to consumers or other borrowers. This credit can come in
the form of different kinds of loans or financial products, including
mortgages, credit cards, and student loans. For any of these products, the
consumer obligation to repay debt creates a prospective cash stream.
Originators can then sell the rights to these cash streams. Rights to cash
streams from different financial products can then be bundled together
and resold in the later stages of a securitization described below.55
The use of risk models (or “code”) begins in earnest at this first stage
of securitization. Originators employ the combination of advanced
marketing software, data mining, and increasingly detailed credit reports
to gather information on the creditworthiness of borrowers.56 This
information is used both to determine whether to approve or deny a loan
and to set interest rates to match credit risk.57 Many originators use risk
modeling and other software more aggressively in actively marketing
financial products to consumers. This marketing can include creating
complex provisions in a contract that are tailored to different types of
consumers.58
Consumer-law scholars such as Lauren Willis,59 Oren Bar-Gill, and

55. For a primer on securitizations, see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization,
1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135 (1994).
56. Willis, supra note 6.
57. Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 123, 126–27 (2007) (comparing “average-cost pricing,” in which lenders set interest rates for
the average credit risk of borrowers but may reject loan applicants that pose a higher credit risk with
“risk-based pricing,” in which lenders tailor interest rates to the credit risk of individual borrowers).
Professor McCoy notes, however, that interest rates that are ostensibly set to match credit risk may
also reflect inefficient and socially undesirable motives of lenders, such as rent-seeking and
discrimination. Id. at 127.
58. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 46–52 (2008)
(describing data collection by lenders on consumer borrowing behavior); Elizabeth Warren, The
Middle Class on the Brink of Disaster 7–8 (Apr. 17, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (describing interdisciplinary empirical and experimental work by financial industry into
consumer borrower behavior).
59. See Willis, supra note 6, at 728–29, 737, 768, 829.
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Elizabeth Warren60 have worried that this data mining gives lenders an
information advantage over consumer borrowers, which lenders use to
market financial products that may be potentially exploitative or
otherwise unsuitable for consumers. (These concerns about consumerwealth losses dovetail with the privacy concerns expressed by Lessig on
the use of code in the internet to track personal data for commercial
purposes.61) These scholars have argued that the information-gathering
ability of financial institutions has reversed the traditional information
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. Lenders now have
information about a consumer’s ability to repay and likelihood of default
that the consumer herself does not have.62 These scholars have also
demonstrated that many originators exploit this information asymmetry
to offer complex financial products beyond the understanding of many
consumers who buy them.63 The financial institutions can predict when
consumers will incur penalties and make higher total payments over the
life of a loan when complex features are added. Originators then
incorporate select features to extract maximum revenue from lessinformed consumers.64
This practice became particularly evident in the mortgage market over
the last decade. Mortgage lenders began offering home buyers
mortgages with novel features. These features allowed prospective
buyers to purchase homes that would otherwise lie beyond their means.
Most notably, adjustable rate mortgages (or ARMs) offered buyers low
fixed rates on an introductory or “teaser” basis, with interest rates
converting to a floating, market-based interest rate after a few years.65
ARMs and other “exotic” mortgages would cost borrowers substantially
more over the life of the mortgages than fixed-rate mortgages, but
allowed borrowers to take out mortgages in amounts for which they
would not otherwise qualify.66 Low-income borrowers could thus afford
60. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 58, at 23–25.
61. LESSIG, supra note 22, at 151–56.
62. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 58, at 12–14; Warren, supra note 58, at 7–13.
63. Lauren A. Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197 (2008)
(describing how the revolution in data collection, storage, and processing enable the financialservices industry to model consumer behavior and to market complex products to consumers that
exceed consumer understanding).
64. Id. See also Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 58, at 23–25; Warren, supra note 58, at 13–22.
65. McCoy, supra note 57, at 143–44.
66. The costs to consumers of ARM loans were recognized in legal scholarship over two decades
ago. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: the Need for Mortgage
Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan
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their first home. But these mortgages were not marketed exclusively at
the low-income market; the “subprime” crisis may be a misnomer, as
middle-class borrowers used ARMs and other exotic mortgages to
purchase houses too.67
The risk that these borrowers assumed, often without fully
understanding it, was that interest rates would significantly rise after the
teaser period and push their monthly mortgage expense beyond their
budget. (As Part I.C explains, this problem is exactly what befell many
borrowers with ARM mortgages.) In other words, ARM mortgages
transferred interest-rate risk to borrowers.
As that code enabled mortgage and other lenders to reverse the
information asymmetry and shift risk to consumers, regulators took little
action. Consumer-law scholars have faulted regulators for doing little in
the last decade to protect consumers from complex mortgages (or other
financial products that consumers poorly understood), despite evidence
that consumers were taking on high levels of debt and were assuming
massive interest-rate risk.68
The reasons for this regulatory inaction are manifold.69 One reason
regulators may have become comfortable with the higher levels of risk
assumed by consumers is that the lenders also bore a large measure of
that risk; if consumers defaulted under their mortgages or other loans,
lenders took a loss on whatever they could not recover.70 Both lenders
and financial markets, many regulators assumed, accurately priced and

Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1131 (1984).
67. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not
Enough, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1777, 1793 (2004) (citing lender data that subprime mortgage
market included middle-class black and Hispanic families).
68. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 60, at 70–74.
69. One explanation for regulatory inaction is that the extension of credit with novel features
allowed lower-income consumers to buy their first homes and fueled the economy. Cf. Kristopher
Gerardi et al., Do Households Benefit from Financial Deregulation and Innovation? The Case of the
Mortgage Market 35 (Nat’l Bur. Econ. Res. Working Paper No. W12967, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=971601, (concluding that deregulation and
mortgage innovation made the U.S. housing finance market “less imperfect”). Regulators may have
been wary of upsetting either political support for wider home ownership or the financial industry.
They also may have been reluctant to disrupt the economic growth stimulated by increased home
sales.
70. Cf. THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, POLICY STATEMENT ON
FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (Mar. 2008), reprinted in 14 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 447, 456
(Spr. 2008) [hereinafter President’s Working Group] (noting that many originators who sold
mortgages for securitization still retained some risk of loss if they purchased or guaranteed the
resultant asset-backed securities).
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managed this risk due to the advances in the risk models they
employed.71
ii.

The Pooling and Pricing of Securitizations

Many originators did not fully bear this risk, however, because they
sold a large portion of mortgages (or other financial products) to special
investment vehicles via securitization.72 Therefore, the assumption that
markets optimally managed risk depends on whether the asset-backed
securities issued in those securitizations were accurately priced.73 The
accuracy of the pricing of a securitization, in turn, depends on the quality
of the code used to model the relevant risks.
Analyzing the role of models in pricing a securitization requires an
understanding of the basic structure of securitization and how it transfers
credit risk. The following paragraphs describe the process of securitizing
mortgages, which lies at the heart of the subprime crisis (but this
description could also apply to the securitization of other forms of
consumer debt, such as credit card debt and student loans).
In a mortgage securitization, after mortgage lenders originate
mortgage loans (Stage 1 in Diagram C below), special investment
vehicles (SIVs) buy pools of mortgages using cash paid by investors
who bought securities from those vehicles. (These transactions appear in
Stages 2 and 3 in Diagram C below, and occur practically
simultaneously.) The securities then pay out to investors based on the
cash streams the SIVs receive from the underlying mortgages.74

71. See Greenspan Apr. 8, 2005 Remarks, supra note 21.
72. Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Meltdown, Remarks at the U.S. Monetary Policy
Forum, New York, NY (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/mishkin20080229a.htm, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/
wlr/notes/84washlrev127n72.pdf (discussing incentive problems created by “originate-to-distribute”
model).
73. It also depends on whether purchasers of asset-backed securities and their market
counterparties accurately hedged the risks of those securities. See infra Part I.B.iv.
74. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 376–77 (2008). The underlying mortgages serve as collateral for
the securities, and, in the event of a liquidation of the SIV, would be sold to satisfy the claims of the
security holders.
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Diagram C
By purchasing these asset-backed securities, investors can invest in
the lucrative consumer-credit market (including investing in mortgages,
credit card debt, and student loans) while enjoying several benefits that
are unavailable when extending credit directly to consumers. First, the
purchasers of securities need not collect payments directly from
consumers.75 Second, these securities are theoretically more liquid than
the underlying mortgages.76 Third, asset-backed securities allow
investors to diversify. This diversification occurs in three different ways.
First, the pooling of mortgages means that the risk of default on any
one mortgage is offset by the fact that other mortgages in the pool will
continue to pay out. This risk-spreading through pooling is a central
benefit of all securitizations. But this assumes that losses among
mortgages in the pool will not be highly correlated and that any
correlation can be accurately estimated and will remain roughly
75. Collection of monies and enforcement of remedies against consumers would usually be the
role of a “servicer,” a firm employed by the SIV to conduct these administrative tasks. Anand K.
Bhattacharya & Frank J. Fabozzi, Expanding Frontiers of Asset Securitization, in ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIES 1, 9 (Anand K. Bhattacharya & Frank J. Fabozzi eds., 1996).
76. Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: a New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION 1, 5, 13 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1997).
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constant.77 (These assumptions on correlation have been called into
question by the current global financial crisis as noted in Part II.A.iii).
Second, securitization facilitates diversification because investors in
asset-backed securities are only buying a sliver of the mortgage pool’s
risk, and they can diversify away this risk through other investments in
their portfolios.78 This assumes, however, that losses on the mortgagebacked securities that investors purchase are not highly correlated with
losses on other assets (including other asset-backed securities) in their
portfolios.
Third, investors can achieve diversification through the terms of the
securities being issued. Cash payments on the underlying assets need not
simply flow to holders of securities pro rata. Instead, the securities can
be “structured” to create different classes, or “tranches,” of securities,
with each class having a different level of risk and a different level of
reward. To accomplish this, the indenture or other agreement
establishing the terms of each tranche often employs a complex
“waterfall” rule for payment to different tranches. The waterfall sets the
order in which the classes are entitled to receive payments from the
underlying assets; in a simple waterfall, holders of senior classes receive
amounts due to them in full before holders of junior classes receive
anything. Thus, junior classes face a higher risk of not being paid due to
defaults on the underlying assets and receive compensation for this risk
with a higher interest rate. Different tranches (with different tradeoffs
between risk and reward) appeal to different types of investors. More
complex waterfall rules than the example above allow securitizations to
carve up risk and reward in very finely tuned ways.79
Yet even in the most basic securitization, the success of this slicing,
dicing, and pricing of risk and reward depends on the capability of those
structuring the securitization and those purchasing the securities to
accurately model the risks involved. Code—in the form of complex
pricing and risk models—again played an integral role. This code might
be employed by different financial institutions involved in creating the
structure for a securitization, including the following: originators,
77. Joshua D. Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance 8 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working
Paper No. 09-060, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287363,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n77.pdf.
78. See Kendall, supra note 76, at 13–15.
79. For an explanation of waterfalls and tranching, see Steven P. Baum, The Securitization of
Commercial Property Debt, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION, supra note 76, at 45, 49 (describing
commercial mortgage-backed securities).
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government-sponsored entities that pool and issue mortgage-backed
securities (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae), and investment banks acting
as underwriters for the securities.80
All relied on sophisticated modeling to assess risk and price the
securities and their institutional services accordingly.81 (Of course rating
agencies and their models played an outsized role in structuring
securities as well, which is analyzed in Part I.B.iii.1) Any models for
pricing asset-backed securities need to analyze credit risk and, in order
to do so, must answer two questions. First, the models need to assess the
risk of non-payment (i.e., credit risk) on the underlying assets.82 To
accomplish this, these models require critical information from the
originators on the underlying assets. Given the sheer number and variety
of the underlying assets, originators need to provide certain categories of
information. For mortgages, these categories might include information
on geographic location of the homes, sizes of the mortgage loans, loanto-value ratios of mortgages, interest rates and other significant terms of
the mortgages, and delinquencies on the mortgages.83 When modeling
the risk of mortgage-backed securities, an analysis of this information on
underlying mortgages in the aggregate (on a pool-wide basis) can miss
importance nuances that are apparent when looking at data on the level
of individual mortgages.84
Second, the models need to assess how risk on the underlying assets
would course through the waterfall structure of the securitization and
translate into risk on the various tranches of securities.85
Certain securitizations might package the securities being issued with
some form of credit support, either guarantees from a governmentsponsored entity in the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities,
or a bond insurance policy issued by a bond insurer. Conceptually,
80. For a discussion of the roles of these various players in securitizations, see Kendall, supra
note 76, at 4–14.
81. For a comprehensive analysis of the modeling that sponsors use for structuring
securitizations, see generally ANDREW S. DAVIDSON ET AL., SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURING AND
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS (2003).
82. Id. at 68, 340–42.
83. Id. at 307 (discussing types of aggregate data on mortgages that will effect credit risk for
mortgage-backed securities). Cf. KENNETH G. LORE & CAMERON L. COWAN, MORTGAGE-BACKED
SECURITIES §§ 4:92–4:104 (describing disclosures on mortgage characteristics that would impact
credit risk with respect to mortgage-backed securities), available on Westlaw at “Mortsec.”
84. Cf. Davidson, supra note 81, at 314 (discussing how loan-level data can better predict
prepayment risk than pool-level data).
85. Id. at 38.
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guarantees and bond insurance serve the same function: the guarantor or
bond insurer would promise to make certain payments to investors on
the securities if the SIV failed to do so, and in exchange, the guarantor or
insurer would receive a premium. Of course, to adequately price their
premium, the guarantor or insurer would need to apply a risk model to
assess the risk of non-payment by the SIV.86
In the United States, there is little direct regulation of the supply side
of securitization—for example, regulations governing the structure of
securitizations or specifying which models the sponsors of
securitizations must use. For the supply side of securitization, there is
not so much active outsourcing of regulation as an absence of regulation.
The SEC does regulate disclosure to investors of asset-backed securities.
But the SEC’s Regulation AB, promulgated in 2005, focused principally
on SEC registered securitizations and generally did not address the
majority of asset-backed securities that are privately placed.87 Instead,
regulation of securitization occurs indirectly, through banking and other
regulations that restrict the investments that banks and other institutions
may make. This demand-side regulation, outlined in the next subsection,
outsources significant responsibility for overseeing the risk transfers of
securitization to rating agencies.
iii.

Purchasers of Asset-Backed Securities: Rating Agencies, Regulated
Financial Institutions, Risk Management, and Basel II

Thus far, this Article has considered the use of code by those who put
together securitizations. But code also plays an integral role in the
decisions by investors to purchase these securities, even when investors
do not use their own proprietary computer models to price securities.
1.

Rating Agencies

Instead, investors in asset-backed securities rely heavily on rating
agency analysis. Moreover, regulators outsourced to rating agencies a
large measure of oversight over the risk that these investors take on.88 In
86. Kendall, supra note 76, at 4 (describing insurers’ methods for determining excess collateral or
guaranty policy, including relying on body of historical data).
87. Asset-backed Securities, Securities Act Release 33-8518, Exchange Act Release 34-50905, 70
Fed. Reg. 1506-01 (Jan. 7, 2005) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.).
88. Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: the Dynamics of Financial Product
Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1674–76 (describing rating agencies as “de facto
lawmakers”).
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many securitizations, rating agencies are paid by the SIV to issue credit
ratings of the asset-backed securities. Rating agencies, for example
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch, then apply their own proprietary
risk models to analyze the securitization.89 Like those entities that
sponsor securitizations, rating agencies rely on the originators to provide
information on the underlying assets. Indeed, rating agencies admit to
conducting little independent investigation of securitization beyond the
information provided to them by either the originators or the firms
sponsoring a securitization.90 Some rating agencies have even admitted
to conducting little analysis of underlying assets.91
Rating agencies have a poor track record of predicting credit
problems; major ratings downgrades on asset-backed securities and
corporate debt have come only after the market has already learned that
issuers had serious credit problems.92 Several explanations have been
offered for this failure, including conflicts of interest created by rating
agencies receiving compensation from the companies they rate, and the
rating agencies having no monetary liability for poor performance.93
Some scholars, notably Frank Partnoy, have persuasively argued that

89. Professors Partnoy and Skeel describe rating agency models as the driving force behind the
structuring of securitizations. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 664–68; see also Partnoy & Skeel, supra
note 9, at 1029 (analyzing a type of securitization called collateralized debt obligations).
This may represent a slight overstatement of the role of rating agencies. Some securitizations—
for example, certain mortgage-backed securities issuances guaranteed by Freddie Mac or Fannie
Mae—are not rated. Kendall, supra note 76, at 4. Moreover, concerns have been repeatedly raised
that rating agencies adjust their ratings and models to fit the demands of securitization sponsors
because of inherent conflicts of interest. See, e.g., U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 31–32 (July 2008) [hereinafter “July 2008 SEC Rating Agency Report”],
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf, permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n89.pdf. Sponsors of
securitizations remain the primary architects of the structure of securitizations. Id. at 31.
Even so, structurers and sponsors must anticipate the analysis and concerns of the rating agencies
given the fact that ratings are indispensable to attracting certain investors, as described in Part
I.B.iii.1 infra.
90. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 653.
91. In an oft-repeated quote, Yuri Yoshizawa, the head of Moody’s derivative group explained
the focus of his group’s analysis of collateralized debt obligations: “We’re structure experts. . . .
We’re not underlying-asset experts.” Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE,
Apr. 27, 2008, at 36.
92. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 621, 642, 661.
93. Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in
FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 68–71, 83–89 (Yasuuki Fuchita &
Robert E. Litan eds., 2006).
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regulation is part of the problem.94 Instead of creating incentives for
better monitoring, regulators have undermined those incentives by
granting rating agencies a kind of oligopoly power.95 This power stems
from the fact that the securitization market, including the market for
mortgage-backed securities, focuses largely on institutional investors.96
Many of these institutional investors are restricted by regulation to
purchasing only securities with an investment-grade credit rating.97
Regulations restrict much of the securities investments of many pension
funds,98 and regulated financial institutions, including banks99 and
insurance companies,100 to investment-grade debt. (These restrictions are
designed to ensure the safety of an entity’s assets, and, in the case of a
bank or other regulated financial institution, to mitigate systemic risk.101)
The regulations then provide that only rating agencies that have a special
license from the SEC as “Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations” (NRSROs) can give an investment-grade rating.102 The
handful of NRSROs, and the models they use to rate securities, thus
possess great responsibility for regulating the riskiness of investments
made by a large number of financial institutions.
2.

Risk Management
Purchasers of asset-backed securities not only rely on the code of

94. See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 12, at 681.
95. See id. at 698.
96. Kendall, supra note 76, at 15.
97. James Hedges, Hedge Fund Transparency, in HEDGE FUNDS: STRATEGIES: STRATEGIES, RISK
ASSESSMENT, AND RETURNS 315, 316 (Greg N. Gregoriou et al. eds., 2003) (discussing regulations
that discourage mutual funds from investing in debt below investment grade).
98. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LOANS:
SECURITIZATION FACES SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS 41 n.41 (Oct. 2003).
99. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831e(d)(4)(A) (2009) (provision of Federal Deposit Insurance Act
permitting insured savings banks to invest in investment-grade debt, i.e., debt securities “rated in
one of the 4 highest rating categories by at least one nationally recognized statistical rating
organization”).
100. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 700–01 (1999) (outlining use by state regulators of rating
agencies’ ratings in insurance regulations).
101. Cf. Viral V. Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation
(Jan. 9, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (analyzing whether prudential bank regulations, including
limitations on investments, mitigates systemic risk), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=236401, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/
wlr/notes/84washlrev127n101.pdf.
102. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 623.
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rating agencies to make decisions to purchase individual securities; they
also rely on a mix of ratings and their own internal models to manage the
risk of their overall portfolio. Many large companies, particularly
financial institutions, employ sophisticated proprietary computer-based
models to manage the credit and market risk of their investment
portfolios.103 Some financial institutions also sell risk-management
software and services to smaller companies.104 These models often
employ many of the devices described above in Part I.A.ii, particularly
tools to calculate value-at-risk.105
Securities law requires only indirect and summary disclosure of the
workings of these internal risk models. Federal securities law requires
that publicly registered corporations disclose summaries of quantitative
data about their market-risk exposure,106 and publicly registered
financial institutions must make additional disclosure.107 Of course,
numerous SEC and accounting rules govern financial statement
disclosure of assets and liabilities, and thus give investors information to
assess an issuer’s credit risk.108 But disclosure requirements stop short of
substantive review. Moreover, these regulations do not require in-depth
disclosure of the details of a company’s risk modeling. Even the SEC
rule on quantitative disclosure of market risk—one of the more explicit
regulations—requires simply “a description of the model, assumptions,
and parameters, which are necessary to understand” the numeric
disclosures.109
3.

Basel II
Whereas federal laws on securities disclosure have taken a light

103. GREG N. GREGORIOU, FUNDS OF HEDGE FUNDS 367–69 (2006) (discussing computer-based
models used by hedge funds to make investment decisions).
104. See FRANCESCO SAITA, VALUE AT RISK AND BANK CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 96–97 (2007)
(describing portfolio risk-modeling programs developed by Credit Suisse, J.P. Morgan and others).
105. Id. at 97 (describing J.P. Morgan product features).
106. 17 C.F.R. § 229.305 (2008) (quantitative and qualitative disclosures about market risk).
Accounting standards also require disclosure about a firm’s market risk. See, e.g., Financial
Accounting Standards Board, Original Pronouncements – Accounting Standards as of June 1, 2008,
Vol. II, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 “Accounting For Derivative
Instruments and Hedging Activities” (FAS 133) Paragraph 44 (requiring disclosure in financial
statements on market risk for entities with derivative instruments).
107. SEC-registered bank holding companies must also disclose the information required by
Guide 3—“Statistical Disclosure by Bank Holding Companies.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 801(c), 231 (2008).
108. See, e.g., FAS supra note 106, at ¶ 44.
109. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.305 (a)(1)(ii)(B), (a)(1)(iii)(C).
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approach to regulating risk models, federal banking regulations in the
wake of Basel II actively outsource regulatory responsibility for risk
management to these models.
This marks a historic shift, as, until recently, banking and insurance
laws had never deferred to the internal risk-management models of
financial institutions, but instead set capital requirements according to
statutory or regulatory formulae.110 One type of U.S. capital requirement,
risk-based capital standards, influenced the creation of international riskbased capital requirements in the international Basel Accord of 1988
(now known as “Basel I”).111 Under Basel I, bank regulators (including
in the United States) set capital requirements to address credit risk
according to a fairly mechanical set of formulae that required financial
institutions to maintain capital according to the predetermined level of
risk associated with different classes of assets on a bank’s balance sheet.
Regulations placed assets in different categories and assigned each
category a different “risk weight.”112
Today, Basel II dramatically alters the scale of outsourcing of setting
standards for regulatory capital for banks to private-industry risk models
in two ways. First, it increases outsourcing of setting capital standards to
ratings agencies (and, by implication, their models).113 Second, it also
outsources the ability to set capital requirements to the internal risk
models of banks for the first time; Basel II now permits certain large
banks to use internal models to set their own regulatory capital
requirements.114 These two trends are reflected in a series of two-part
rules that Basel II establishes with respect to how national regulators
may set bank capital requirements. In the first part of each rule,

110. Federal bank regulators are required to set minimum capital requirements under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831o(c)(1)m (2008) and 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (2008).
111. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (July 1988, updated to April 1998) [hereinafter
“Basel I”], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf?noframes=1, permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n111.pdf. For historical
background on adoption of this accord, see Joseph Jude Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: a
Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
1299, 1336–42 (1989). See also JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION
281–82 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing history of U.S. risk-based capital standards leading to Basel I).
112. See BASEL I, supra note 111, at Part II. Professor Partnoy notes that, historically, numerous
U.S. banking regulations have also keyed off of rating agency ratings. Partnoy, supra note 12, at
687–89, 691 n.349.
113. See supra notes 13 and 15 and accompanying text.
114. Norton, supra note 14, at 53–58.
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regulators apply a standardized set of capital requirements for most
banks (and these standardized capital requirements rely heavily on rating
agency determinations). In the second part of each rule, regulators may
allow select banks to use their internal risk-models to set capital
requirements. Basel II uses this two-part, bifurcated rule on capital
requirements to cover credit risk; Basel II supplements a standardized set
of rules that rely on rating agencies with a new “Internal Ratings-Based
Approach” that allows certain banks to use internal models to set their
capital requirements.115 It then uses a similar bifurcated set of rules—a
standard approach and an internal-models exception for certain banks—
in its separate capital requirements that cover market risk116 and
115. Under the new accord, national bank regulators may apply one of three approaches to setting
requirements for the level of regulatory capital that banks must hold to offset credit risk. Each of the
following approaches allows regulators to permit banks to use private-sector risk models to make
credit risk calculations, which determine the amount of capital required to cover that risk:
1.
Credit-Risk Standardized Approach: National bank regulators may continue to apply a
modified version of Basel I, with its categorical approach to setting capital requirements for
credit risk. This “Standardized Approach” categorizes classes of bank assets into “buckets”
according to a rough estimate of the credit risk posed by that class. Regulators then assign a
fixed risk weight for all assets in a particular bucket. Banks must then maintain a level of
capital for each of its assets equal to the value of that asset multiplied by the asset’s risk
weight. Basel II, supra note 13, at 19–26. The Basel II Standardized Approach keys the risk
weights that apply to many of the buckets to rating agency ratings. Id. Furthermore, banks
may use certain “external credit assessments”—i.e., rating agency ratings—to lower the
risk weights (and thus the capital requirements) for certain classes of assets even further
below the amount the Accord specifies for a particular bucket. Id. at 27–28.
2.
Credit-Risk Foundation Internal Ratings-Based Approach: Basel II also gives national
bank regulators the option to allow a bank to determine credit risk capital requirements
using the bank’s internal credit risk modeling, what the accord labels the “Internal RatingsBased Approach.” Id. at 52. The Internal Ratings-Based Approach has two versions. The
“Foundation Internal Ratings-Based Approach” gives banks less flexibility in calculating
their risk exposure. In calculating expected losses from borrower default on a given asset,
banks can use their own internal models to calculate the probability of default. But, to
calculate the magnitude of loss given a borrower default on an asset, banks must use a
categorical, risk-weighted number assigned to all assets of the same class. This mirrors the
bucket system of the Standardized Approach. Id. at 59–60.
3.
Credit-Risk Advanced Internal Ratings-Based Approach: The “Advanced Internal RatingsBased Approach,” by contrast, allows banks to use internal models to calculate both
probability and magnitude of losses from credit risk for purposes of setting risk weights for
assets. Id.
116. Basel II also take a bifurcated approach to the standard for regulatory capital that banks must
hold to offset market risk, establishing both the following standardized and internal model
approaches:
1. Market-Risk Standardized Measurement Method: Basel II’s standardized method for
market risk specifies a complex mix of bucket risk weights and value-at-risk methodology
to set capital requirements covering market-risk exposure. National bank regulators must
then ensure that banks follow this standard in determining credit-risk exposure, which then
determines capital requirements. For sovereign debt and similar assets, the standardized
method again piggybacks on rating agency ratings. Id. at 166–90.
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operational risk, respectively.117
By giving banks the flexibility to adjust their regulatory capital
according to a mix of rating agency ratings and the respective banks’
internal models, Basel II outsources significant regulatory authority to
the models of rating agencies and banks. To be sure, the Accord sets
standards for when national regulators may allow banks to use internal
models, and requires regulators to audit those models.118 But these
lengthy standards give bank regulators significant discretion in both
deciding which banks qualify for the privilege to use internal models and
in determining when and how to audit the models of those banks.
In December 2007, the principal federal bank regulators—the Federal
Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), FDIC,
and Office of Thrift Supervision—passed a final rule implementing
much of the Basel II Accord.119 Even though Basel II is still being
implemented, several studies have indicated that the provisions of Basel
II that give banks the ability to set their capital requirements according
to internal models would lead to substantial declines in regulatory capital
and undercapitalization for credit risk.120
2.

Market-Risk Internal Models Approach: As with credit risk, Basel II allows national bank
regulators to permit qualified banks to use their own internal risk models to determine
market-risk exposure. Basel II favors a value-at-risk approach, and sets standards for these
internal risk models, but this “Internal Models Approach” gives banks much more
flexibility in using their own methodologies than the standardized approach listed above.
Id. at 191–203.
117. Unlike Basel I, the Basel II Accord requires banks to set aside capital for operational risk.
But again, the newer accord takes a bifurcated approach:
1. Operational-Risk Basic-Indicator Approach & Standardized Approach: These two
approaches require banks to set aside regulatory capital to cover operational-risk exposure
based on a fixed percentage of a bank’s income in previous years. The principal difference
between these two approaches—the Basic-Indicator Approach & the Standardized
Approach—is that the Standardized Approach is slightly more nuanced. It disaggregates a
bank’s income according to different lines of business and sets distinct capital requirement
weights for each of those lines. Id. at 144–46.
2. Advanced Measurement Approach: This approach gives national regulators the flexibility
to allow banks under their jurisdiction to use their internal models based on empirical data
of the banks’ past operational losses to set operational capital. Id. at 147.
118. See, e.g., Basel II, supra note 13, at Part 3, Section III (specifying supervisory review
process that regulators must undertake to review bank compliance).
119. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework – Basel II, 72 Fed.
Reg. 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 559, 560, 563, 567).
120. After conducting a “Quantitative Impact Study” of the prospective effects of the Internal
Ratings-Based Approach, U.S. bank regulators expressed concern that this new rule would
dramatically lower regulatory capital. See, e.g., Pamela Martin, QIS 4: What Do the Numbers Really
Mean?, RMA J., Sept. 1, 2005; see also Paul H. Kupiec, Basel II: A Case for Recalibration (FDIC
Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2006-13, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=942301, permanent copy available at
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The SEC, Basel II, and Consolidated Supervised Entities

The Basel II Accord explicitly addresses only the regulation of banks
and not other financial institutions. Moreover, the accord is still being
implemented in the United States and elsewhere. Nevertheless, in 2004,
the SEC decided to apply Basel II when setting capital requirements for
certain large financial-holding companies as part of the Commission’s
new Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) Program.121 In particular, the
SEC allowed these holding companies to use their internal risk models
to set their own regulatory capital. The creation of the CSE Program was
driven in part by lobbying by large U.S. financial conglomerates for
more flexible capital requirements that would give these firms greater
ability to compete with foreign competitors.122
Broker-dealer holding companies could opt into this program, after
which the SEC would supervise not only registered broker-dealer
entities, which it has historically regulated, but unregulated affiliates and
the holding-company parents of those broker-dealers. According to the
SEC, the program was “designed to allow the Commission to monitor
for financial or operational weakness in a CSE holding company or its

http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n120a.pdf; Paul H. Kupiec, Capital
Adequacy and Basel II (FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2004-02, 2004),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2004/wp2004/CFRWP_2004-02_Kupiec.pdf,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n120b.pdf
(concluding that Basel II’s Internal Ratings-Based Approach drastically undercapitalizes portfolio
credit risk); Paul H. Kupiec, Capital Allocation for Portfolio Credit Risk (Dec. 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=681201, permanent
copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n120c.pdf.
121. Final Rule: Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of
Consolidated Supervised Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49,830, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June
21, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-49830.htm, permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n121.pdf.
122. Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ‘04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2008, at A1.
The program also responded in part to a European Union (EU) regulatory initiative that would
give a non-EU financial conglomerate the ability to obtain a single license to operate across the EU,
provided that the firm demonstrated that it (i.e., all the firm’s affiliates on a consolidated basis) was
subject to sufficient regulatory supervision by a single home-country regulator. Unless U.S.
financial conglomerates were bank holding companies and thus subject to ultimate supervision by
the Federal Reserve, they would not qualify for special EU status. U.S investment banks not owned
by a bank-holding company thus found themselves at a potential regulatory disadvantage. Id. See
also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED
ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM 4 (2008), Report No. 446-B (Sept.
25, 2008), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2008/446-a.pdf,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n122.pdf.
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unregulated affiliates that might place . . . U.S. regulated broker-dealers
and other regulated entities at risk.”123 Ultimately, the following seven
financial-holding companies, which included the largest U.S.
investment-banking firms, joined the CSE program: the Bear Stearns
Companies, Inc., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc., Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch & Co., Citigroup Inc., and
JP Morgan Chase & Co.124
With respect to these CSEs, the SEC took responsibility for setting
regulatory capital. But it decided not to apply the same capital-standard
regulatory framework that it had applied to SEC-registered brokerdealers before the CSE Program. That standard framework, also known
as the Net Capital Rule,125 requires that broker-dealers maintain capital
according to fairly mechanical financial ratios that vary according to the
types of securities business that a broker-dealer is conducting. Instead of
this approach, the SEC allowed CSEs to set capital requirements
according to internal risk models. After the CSE rules took effect in
2004, the regulatory capital of those entities admitted to the program
dropped. At the same time, these firms dramatically increased their level
of borrowing to finance investments, as documented by soaring leverage
ratios.126
The SEC regulations establishing the program included standards for
the SEC in both vetting holding companies applying to join the program
(including standards for examining the quality of each applicant’s riskmanagement policies and risk modeling) and auditing those companies
that were admitted to the program. The rules also contained a floor
below which a CSE’s capital could not fall. In spite of this, a 2008 SEC
Inspector General Report detailed significant lapses by the SEC in
following its own regulations in vetting program applicants and the
adequacy of their risk models, and auditing the risk management and
modeling of those firms admitted to the program.127

123. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 122, at 4.
124. Id. at iv. The SEC exercised direct oversight, including with respect to capital requirements
for five of these firms; Citigroup and JP Morgan continued to have the Federal Reserve as their
principal regulator. Id. at v.
125. Net Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2009).
126. See Labaton, supra note 122, at A1.
127. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 122, at ix, xi–xii.
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Hedging Risks: Derivatives and Hedge Funds

Banks and non-banks alike use not only capital to mitigate risk, but
increasingly use derivatives as well. More particularly, banks and other
investors have used derivatives to hedge the risks of asset-backed
securities in their portfolios—including the credit risk posed by payment
default on those securities. The derivatives employed for this purpose
and for hedging other risks have become increasingly complex and
esoteric over the last fifteen years. During the same time, trading in
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives has skyrocketed.128
Simultaneously, the amount of money under management globally by
unregulated hedge funds has exploded.129 These three phenomena—risks
from asset-backed securities, the expansion of derivatives markets, and
the growth of hedge funds—are intertwined, as explained in the
following paragraphs. Although derivatives can be used for many
reasons, they are often used as a consequence of securitization. Investors
can hedge the residual credit risk associated with asset-backed securities
in their portfolios by entering into a special type of derivative
transaction, called a credit default swap, with a counterparty. Under a
credit default swap, this counterparty will pay the investor a specified
amount upon the occurrence of a contractually defined “credit event,”
e.g., non-payment by the issuing SIV on the asset-backed security held
by the investor. In exchange for assuming this measure of default risk,
the counterparty receives a premium from the investor.130 The
transaction thus resembles a form of guarantee or credit insurance policy
on the asset-backed security.131

128. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, TRIENNIAL CENTRAL BANK SURVEY: FOREIGN
EXCHANGE AND DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN 2007, 2–3 (Dec. 2007).
129. John H. Makin, Hedge Funds: Origin and Evolution, AEI POLICY SERIES – AEI ONLINE,
May 15, 2006, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24395/pub_detail.asp, permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n129.pdf.
130. Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of U.S. Housing
Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 89 (2008).
131. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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Diagram D sketches out the basic economic bargain of a credit default
swap.132
Special
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Diagram D
Counterparties thus reap significant rewards but take on significant
risks. Because this risk may be too much for regulated financial
institutions to bear legally, unregulated hedge funds comprise a
significant percentage of counterparties to derivatives.133
Just as in the stages of a securitization, code—in the form of the same
types of computer-based risk models—enables and drives hedging. Both

132. For the sake of simplicity, this diagram removes the originator. If the originator is deemed to
have made a “true sale” of the assets to the SIV, the assets are no longer considered part of the
estate of the originator in bankruptcy. The SIV is then the outright owner of the consumer
mortgages, and the originator no longer has any impact on the risk being transferred from borrowers
to the SIV and investors. For a discussion of “true sales” in securitizations, see Steven L. Schwarcz,
Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1543–48 (2004).
133. For an analysis of the extensive use by hedge funds of credit derivatives, see Noah L.
Wynkoop, Note, The Unregulables? The Perilous Confluence of Hedge Funds and Credit
Derivatives, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 3095 (2008) (arguing that heavy use of lightly regulated credit
derivatives by unregulated hedge funds increases systemic risk).
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derivative parties must assess the risks involved to price the contract, yet
without sophisticated models, pricing becomes impossible. But
modeling becomes more difficult because derivatives lay a further step
removed from their underlying assets. Therefore, modeling how risks in
the underlying mortgages affect derivatives requires either more
powerful models and detailed information on the underlying assets on
the one hand, or a set of simplifying assumptions on the other. One
simplifying assumption is to rely on previous rating agency
determinations; to avoid performing a thorough analysis of the credit
risk on the underlying assets, a credit default swap model could simply
use a rating agency rating as a proxy for credit risk.134
The complexity of credit default swaps and other derivatives led to
great deference by regulators, who struggled to keep pace even as
derivatives became more complex and the derivative market expanded.
Regulators have been reluctant to regulate OTC derivatives for fear of
stifling innovation in the spreading of risk.135 Regulators have placed
great faith in the capacity of the market to self-regulate derivatives, and
this self-regulation rests ultimately on the perceived strength of the risk
models that are used to price derivatives.136
Hedge funds have received similar regulatory deference, as some U.S.
regulators have argued that regulation is unnecessary because market
counterparties, armed with sophisticated pricing models, provide the
necessary discipline against excessive risk-taking.137 Meanwhile, the
SEC was stymied in its efforts to require hedge funds to register with the
Commission and provide basic data to the SEC.138
v.

Iterations: CDOs and Derivatives to the nth Power

The discussion thus far has greatly oversimplified the structure of
asset-backed securities and derivatives. For example, securitizations can
134. See Willem H. Buiter, Lessons from the 2007 Financial Crisis, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC
POLICY RESEARCH POLICY INSIGHT NO. 18, 2–3 (Dec. 2007) available at http://www.cepr.org/
pubs/PolicyInsights/PolicyInsight18.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.
edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n134.pdf.
135. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
136. Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–
2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 343–46
(describing flaws in value-at-risk models used to price derivatives, since these models are only
“backtested” by regulators).
137. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.

162

AUTHOR_FINAL_EDITS_GERDING_5-22-09B.DOC

6/7/2009 6:51 PM

Code, Crash, and Open Source
become even more complex when mortgage-backed securities (or other
asset-backed securities) are themselves securitized. As Diagram E below
illustrates, a new SIV could purchase these mortgage-backed securities
and use them as collateral for another securitization, often called a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO).139
Special
Investment
Vehicle

Investors

Various
Underlying Assetbacked Securities

Cash

New
Investors
New Assetbacked
Securities

Cash

Diagram E
Securities issued in CDOs are often resecuritized themselves, creating
what is called a “CDO-squared.”140 The iterative layering of
securitizations of securitizations of securitizations became wildly
popular in financial markets in the last seven years.141 Similarly,
investors who assumed risks in derivative transactions could then hedge
those risks with other derivatives.142
But, complexity of securitizations of securitizations and derivatives
hedging derivatives makes modeling the risks involved frighteningly
difficult. Each layer of a securitization of a securitization moves further
away from the underlying assets where risk originates. This makes
predicting, for example, the effects of widespread default on the ultimate
underlying assets as they cascade through the securitization chain
exponentially more complex.143
Just as with a basic securitization or credit default swap, modelers
looking to measure the credit risk of the securities issued in a CDO-

139. Kendall, supra note 76, at 15.
140. Coval et al., supra note 77, at 10.
141. Unterman, supra note 130, at 70. One presidential commission cited failures of rating
agencies to evaluate securitizations of mortgage-backed securities as a key factor in the subprime
crisis. President’s Working Group, supra note 70, at 449.
142. Hu, supra note 9, at 1502.
143. Kendall, supra note 76, at 8–11 (describing valuation of “synthetic securities”).
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squared face high costs in identifying—let alone finding information
about the credit risk posed by—the numerous underlying mortgages and
other cash-producing assets that ultimately back the CDO-squared.
These modelers again make simplifying assumptions, such as relying on
the credit ratings assigned to the securities immediately prior in the
securitization chain. Using rating agencies as an analytic shortcut,
however, places a great deal of faith in the accuracy and integrity of
those ratings.
C.

The Crash of the New Financial Code: A Thumbnail Sketch

The proliferation of code throughout the web of financial markets
described above in Part I.B had dire consequences, as the crash of
multiple codes was a driving factor of the subprime crisis. The crisis has
numerous causes and has unfolded (and continues to unfold) in
incredibly complex ways that will occupy economists for decades. The
following paragraphs present merely a thumbnail sketch of the crisis to
highlight the extent to which the various risk models described in Part
I.B failed.
The subprime crisis began in 2007, when defaults on ARMs began
rising as teaser rates on ARMs expired, leaving many subprime
borrowers unable to make payments at the higher reset rate.144 Rising
market interest rates cut off the exit options for borrowers by both
making refinancing prohibitively expensive and drying up the resale
market; home prices began to level or drop in many markets after years
of steady gains.145 The pricing and risk models of many originators and
rating agencies utterly failed to predict the waves of defaults by
mortgage borrowers that followed.146
The wave of defaults swelled enough to affect mortgage-backed
securities. First, junior classes plummeted in value.147 Later waves of
defaults undermined the value of senior classes, despite the protections
of payment waterfalls and tranching structures.148 Defaults on asset144. Gretchen Morgenson, Home Loans: A Nightmare Grows Darker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007,
at C1.
145. Id. See also Jia Lynn Yang, How Bad is the Mortgage Crisis Going to Get?, FORTUNE, Mar.
31, 2008, at 88.
146. Lowenstein, supra note 91.
147. Nelson D. Schwartz & Vikas Bajaj, Credit Time Bomb Ticked, but Few Heard, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2007, at A1.
148. Greg B. Cioffi, Collateralized Damage, DAILY DEAL, Feb. 1, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 1910083; Robert Stowe, Anatomy of a Meltdown, 68 MORTGAGE BANKING 38, Oct. 1,
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backed securities triggered guarantees and credit-insurance policies, and
unprepared guarantors and credit insurers themselves threatened to
falter.149
Growing losses for financial institutions on mortgages and
mortgaged-backed securities created two aftershocks. First, lenders
decreased mortgage and other lending, which drove market interest rates
higher and started a credit crunch. The higher interest rates created a
feedback loop, worsening default rates on ARMs.150 Second, the
plummeting value of asset-backed securities forced many financial
institutions to make substantial write-downs of assets on their balance
sheets, a process that continues.151 The value of many of these assets has
become extremely uncertain, since buyers for asset-backed securities
have disappeared.152 In addition, the iteration of securitization upon
securitization meant that default of one class of securitization cascaded
and caused losses in subsequent securitizations. The many layers of
securitization—CDOs backed by CDOs in an iterative chain—prevented
investors later in the securitization chain from calculating the risk they
faced from losses on assets earlier in the chain.153
The write-down of assets began to affect the creditworthiness, real
and perceived, of many institutional investors.154 Many investors were
forced to sell asset-backed securities to improve their balance sheets,155
but they faced a liquidity risk problem similar to that of mortgageholders; the initial depression of the prices of asset-backed securities,
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 21537515.
149. Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bond Insurer in Turmoil Turns to Familiar Lender, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2008, at C2.
150. Shawn Tully, Risk Returns with a Vengeance, FORTUNE, Sept. 3, 2007, at 50.
151. Charles Duhigg, A Trickle that Turned into a Torrent, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, at C1
(reporting that major banks are writing down twenty to fifty percent of the value of their assets due
to losses from mortgage-backed securities).
152. Louise Story, A Values Debate (Not the Political Kind), N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at C1
(reporting on debate over whether mark-to-market rule in Financial Accounting Statement 157 was
leading to overstated write-downs); see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Are Bean Counters to Blame?¸
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008, at C1 (same).
153. Buiter, supra note 134, at 3. See also Matthew Goldstein & David Henry, Bear Bets Wrong,
BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 22, 2007, at 50 (linking Bear Stearns’ deteriorating credit situation to
uncertain value of “CDO-squared” securities it held).
154. Landon Thomas, Jr., Run on Big Wall St. Bank Spurs U.S.-Backed Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 2008, at A1 (describing contagious loss of investor and creditor confidence in U.S. investment
banks).
155. Liz Rappaport & Justin Lahart, Debt Reckoning: U.S. Receives a Margin Call, WALL. ST. J.,
Mar. 15, 2008, at A1.
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combined with the volume of sellers in the market in the same
predicament, sent the prices of these securities into a tailspin and dried
up liquidity.156
This created a reputation risk problem for many institutional
investors. Creditors, including stock-lending and derivative
counterparties, began worrying about the credit risk posed by many
institutions and made margin calls.157 Many large commercial and
investment banks were forced to seek emergency equity infusions to
shore up their balance sheets, reassure creditors, and meet regulatory
capital requirements.158
A few prominent institutions failed in their attempts to stay afloat.159
Threats to the solvency of financial institutions and hedge funds created
fears of systemic risk and threatened to cause the collapse of other
institutions because of the domino effects of credit and counterparty risk.
Failure of one firm could trigger the collapse of other institutions
because of the complex web of counterparty risk created by
derivatives.160 Moreover, the contagion of depositor or creditor panic
exacerbated reputation and systemic risk.161
Some of the most prominent financial institutions that fell victim to
the crisis were the financial conglomerates that were able to lower their
regulatory capital and increase their leverage under the SEC’s CSE
Program.162 The failure or threat of failure to these large institutions,
including Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, prompted extraordinary
federal intervention into financial markets.
A full listing, let alone explanation, of all these interventions is
beyond the scope of this Article (and new massive interventions

156. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds Are Squeezed by Investors and Lenders, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2007, at C1.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Eric Dash, IndyMac Announces It Will Close Lending Units and Cut Half of Its
Work Force, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2008, at C3; David Jolly, After Losses, UBS Seeks to Raise $15
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at C5.
159. Goldstein & Henry, supra note 153 (reporting on bailout of Bear Stearns); Dash, supra note
158 (reporting on insolvency of IndyMac Bank).
160. Herring & Schuermann, supra note 45, at 22 (discussing systemic risk threat posed by
securities firms by virtue of OTC derivatives activity).
161. Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bear Stearns Staves Off Collapse of 2 Hedge Funds, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2007, at C1 (reporting that potential failure of Bear Stearns’ hedge fund raised
investor concerns over systemic risk).
162. See Labaton, supra note 122, at A1; Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws
Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at A17.
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continue to take shape even as it goes to press). Nevertheless, the sheer
scope of the federal intervention and the magnitude of financialinstitution losses provide lurid evidence of the systemic failure of
financial-institution risk models; these models failed to measure the risk
of default by mortgage borrowers, price asset-backed securities or
derivatives proportionate to their true risks, or ensure adequate hedging
and risk management by financial institutions.163
The failures of these risk models also signal a failure of the
government agencies that outsourced financial regulatory responsibility
to the models. As but one example, the SEC’s CSE Program has come
under withering criticism, including from the Commission’s own Office
of Inspector General. In a September 2008 study of the SEC’s
contribution to the collapse of Bear Stearns, the Inspector General
criticized the program for allowing CSEs to lower capital to inadequate
levels. The study criticized the SEC for failures in both vetting firms
(including vetting their risk models) that applied for CSE status and
auditing firms (and their risk modeling) once they became CSEs.164
D.

Historical Parallels: The 1987 Crash and the Failure of LongTerm Capital Management

Two financial crises in the last two decades—the 1987 stock market
crash and the demise of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998—have
sobering parallels to the current crisis. In both earlier events, as in the
ongoing “subprime” episode, flawed financial modeling enabled by
sophisticated software exacerbated a market crisis, with regulators left
unprepared.
i.

The 1987 Crash

The 1987 stock market crash was aggravated, if not caused by, the
widespread use of novel forms of computer-based hedging of risks
called portfolio insurance and program trading.165 Regulators and
163. Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 2, 2009, at 26–33, 46, 50.
164. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 122, at 17–23 (criticizing of vetting of CSE
risk assessment); 24–27 (criticizing of vetting of CSE risk modeling).
165. Ross M. Miller, The Leap from Free Markets to Autonomous Markets, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 295 (2006); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial
Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 215, 341.
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scholars blamed the crisis on financial institutions that had placed their
risk hedging on virtual autopilot.166 Poorly understood computer-based
models were allowed to set major investment and risk management
decisions.167 Homogeneity in these models, combined with poor
operational oversight, led many institutional investors to begin selling
off the same assets simultaneously at the occurrence of what seemed to
be a minor market blip.168 This caused falling stock market indexes to
drop precipitously.169 In the aftermath, studies criticized regulators for
failing to understand and adequately regulate portfolio insurance and
program trading.170
ii.

The Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management

Misplaced faith in computer-based risk models led to another dire
financial crisis over a decade after the 1987 Crash, when the Long-Term
Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund collapsed in 1998. This fund
had used mathematical models to set investment strategies in exotic
financial products, including asset-backed securities.171 The principals of
the fund believed that they could identify outsized profit opportunities
with minimal risk because their computer-based models could calculate
risk with precision based on massive amounts of data on historic market
volatility.172 But these models made many assumptions, including that:
• future market movements would follow historical patterns;
• historical market data inputted into the models covered a
sufficiently long period of time;
• market losses were essentially random instead of correlated;
and
• the distribution of gains and losses followed a normal
distribution.173
166. Miller, supra note 165.
167. For an account of the role of portfolio insurance in the 1987 crash, see generally RICHARD
BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF
FINANCIAL INNOVATION 9–31 (2007).
168. Id. at 17.
169. Id. at 17–24.
170. See generally David D. Haddock, An Economic Analysis of the Brady Report: Public
Interest, Special Interest, or Rent Extraction, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 841 (1989).
171. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT 62–69 (2000).
172. Id. at 63–65.
173. Id. at 64–77. LTCM’s models also assumed that the volatility of any security remains
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Based on these assumptions, LTCM assumed it could effectively
manage a portfolio of complex financial instruments with little risk; if
markets moved according to LTCM’s models, the fund could readjust its
portfolio and enter into and unwind hedges before it incurred major
losses.174
These assumptions and the core faith of LTCM and its investors in the
perfection of the fund’s models proved disastrously misplaced. Russia’s
unexpected default on its sovereign debt in August 1998 caused
enormous and historically unusual volatility across the world’s capital
markets and a sudden, sharp increase in credit spreads.175 This
unexpected movement in credit markets caused massive losses for
LTCM.176 Fear that these losses would lead to the cascading failures of
major financial institutions prompted the Federal Reserve to orchestrate
a bailout of the fund by major investment banks, many of whom faced
potentially massive losses due to trades with LTCM.177
II.

MODEL RISK: DIAGNOSTICS ON THE CRASH OF CODE

The scope of the current global financial crisis and the necessity of
massive government intervention demonstrate the failure of the risk
models throughout the web.
This Part seeks to explain several of the weaknesses inherent in these
models—the new financial code—that contributed to this failure. Given
that the crisis continues to unfold, and collecting extensive empirical
data on model failures remains a work in progress, this Part does not
attempt to quantify the relative causal contributions of any one of these
weaknesses to the crisis. Instead, it provides a typography of various
flaws that contributed to yet another risk—“model risk,” which describes
potential losses due to inaccurate risk models themselves.178
constant and that securities trade in “continuous time” with no significant gaps between the posting
of new prices for securities. Id. at 68.
174. Id. at 68.
175. Id. at 140–41, 144–45.
176. Id. at 145–47.
177. Id. at 185–218.
178. For a discussion of model risk, see Toshiyasu Kato & Toshinao Yoshiba, Model Risk and Its
Control, B ANK OF J APAN M ONETARY AND E CONOMIC S TUDIES (Dec. 2000), available at
http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/english/publication/mes/2000/me18-2-5.pdf, permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n178a.pdf; see also Ingo Fender & John
Kiff, CDO Rating Methodology: Some Thoughts on Model Risk and Its Implications (Bank for
International Settlements, Working Paper No. 163, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
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These flaws fall into two broad categories: flaws in the technical
design of the models, and flaws stemming from the skewed incentives of
the parties who select, implement, and use those models. These two
sources of weakness are difficult to disentangle. Indeed, aspects of riskmodeling technology, including its inherent complexity, can facilitate its
manipulation by self-interested actors. Part II.A examines the failure of
the new financial code starting from the vantage point of flaws in
technical design. Part II.B analyzes the “user interface” of the code, with
a primary focus on the agency costs that affect the incentives of those
individuals working in financial institutions who select and use different
risk models.
A.

Design Flaws

i.

Non-Robust Model Assumptions

The most simple and, at the same time, most complex explanation for
the failure of codes is that they were built on flawed assumptions. These
models, like any financial or scientific models, make simplifying
assumptions about market behavior in order to generate predictions in
the face of complexity. Policymakers and scholars have speculated that
the root of the failure of risk modeling was simply non-robust
assumptions and inadequate stress testing,179 and back testing180 of
models to root out these faulty assumptions.181
Some policymakers and scholars have faulted the value-at-risk
models used by financial institutions for having improper parameters,
such as too low of a confidence interval or an unrealistic assumption of
the length of the period in which the institution would hold the
investment portfolio.182 Other critics fault modelers for not going back
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=623662, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.
edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n178b.pdf.
179. See supra note 53 and accompanying text for a definition of stress testing.
180. Id.
181. Oddly, though one of the most outspoken champions of the capacity of risk models (and
other aspects of the new financial code), Alan Greenspan (see supra notes 17 and 21) now attributes
the cause of the subprime crisis to flaws in risk-model assumptions. Alan Greenspan, We Will Never
Have a Perfect Model of Risk, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008; see also Jón Daníelsson, Blame the
Models, __ J. FIN. STABILITY __ (forthcoming 2008) available at http://risk.lse.ac.uk/rr/files/JD33.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/
wlr/notes/84washlrev127n181.pdf.
182. The basic construction of a value-at-risk model is outlined in notes 48–51 supra.
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far enough in history to gather loss data to be inputted into the model.183
Indeed, small sample sizes of historical losses can skew results.184 For
example, a model used in 2006 based on data on market movements in
the previous seven years would have missed valuable data points such as
the 1998 LTCM crisis.185 If that same 2006 model had used data from
the previous 15 years, it would not have factored data from the 1987
stock-market crash.186 Some policymakers and scholars also fault models
that do not capture risk probabilities that have “fat-tails,” i.e., for not
properly measuring lower-probability, but high-magnitude risks.187
Economists have noted that small errors in assumptions in modeling
the risk of the assets underlying a securitization can lead to dramatic
errors in modeling the risk associated with asset-backed securities. This
initial error is magnified further when modeling the risk of
securitizations of those asset-backed securities (CDOs), and magnified
even more for subsequent securitizations (CDOs-squared).188
These technical flaws can be solved with technical fixes, including
stress testing value-at-risk determinations using different confidence
levels and different model assumptions.189 However, the argument that
risk model approaches basically work, but that technical glitches need to
be fixed, offers a dangerously incomplete account of the current
financial crisis. The fact that so many financial institutions incurred such
large losses (forcing the federal government to make unprecedented
interventions in the market) suggests that there was something
systemically wrong with either the models or their implementation.
183. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION JOINT FORUM, CROSS-SECTORAL REVIEW OF
GROUP -W IDE IDENTIFICATION AND M ANAGEMENT OF R ISK C ONCENTRATIONS (Apr. 2008),
available at http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Cross-sectoral_review_of_group-wide_identification_
and_management_of_risk_concentrations__April_2008.pdf, permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n183.pdf.
184. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION JOINT FORUM, CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT: PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE BASEL II MARKET RISK FRAMEWORK (July 2008)
(proposing standards for quality control of market risk models).
185. See supra Part I.D.ii.
186. See supra Part I.D.i.
187. Daníelsson, supra note 181.
188. Coval et al., supra note 77, at 10.
189. More complicated statistical methods, including Extreme Value Theory, can build further
nuance into models to compensate for the potential of “fat-tails.” For a detailed academic work on
such statistical techniques, see PAUL EMBRECHTS ET AL., MODELLING EXTREMAL EVENTS FOR
INSURANCE AND FINANCE (2003). Technical fixes and additional stress testing and back testing
appears to be the approach favored by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See, e.g.,
supra notes 183–184.
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The Radical Critique: The Failure of Models in the Face of
Uncertainty

In stark contrast to the previous explanation, Nicholas Taleb presents
a more radical technocratic critique of risk modeling, namely that valueat-risk determinations, including those based on Monte Carlo
simulations, are deeply flawed because future losses are unknown and
unknowable and cannot be predicted based on historical patterns. In
other words, Taleb argues that losses in the future are characterized by
“uncertainty” rather than “risk.”190 He claims that markets continue to
evolve and defy historical patterns; “one-hundred-year floods” (what he
has famously labeled “black swans”) occur frequently, but the timing,
magnitude, and the exact mix of risks posed by these crises defy
prediction and probabilistic thinking. Therefore, even sophisticated
probabilistic models, such as value-at-risk determinations, according to
him, are useless.191
While philosophically provocative, Taleb’s radical critique has
uncertain practical implications. If losses are inherently unknowable, it
is unclear how investors would ever estimate losses or even make basic
investment decisions. It is also unclear how regulators should establish
risk regulations, such as traditional regulatory capital requirements.
iii.

Risk Correlation

There is another fundamental problem with value-at-risk modeling
practice that is less ethereal than Taleb’s critique. Risk models often
underestimate or completely overlook the correlation of losses among
various assets pooled together—whether they are mortgages pooled
together to back mortgage-backed securities, or different assets held in a
diversified investment portfolio. A high correlation of losses for
different assets pooled together means that when losses do occur, they
can be massive. A loss on one asset may not be offset by gains on other
assets. High correlation of losses—when it rains, it pours—undermines
the foundations of diversification and risk pooling on which effective
risk management depends.192
190. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
191. Nicholas Taleb & Avital Pilpel, Epistemology and Risk Management, RISK & REG. (Summer
2007), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/riskAndRegulationMagazine/magazine/
summer2007/epistemologyAndRiskManagement.htm, permanent copy available at http://www.law.
washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n191.pdf.
192. Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: an Analysis of the Subprime-
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Effective securitization also depends on low correlation of losses on
underlying assets. In other words, one of the key benefits of
securitization—diversification by pooling assets—may rest on the
unfounded assumption that losses on those assets are not correlated.
Several economists have noted how the current crisis revealed the
fallacy of this assumption. The error in this assumption led to massive
losses because of the way in which errors in assumptions with respect to
underlying assets are compounded as those assets are securitized and resecuritized.193
iv.

Spillover Effects and Feedback Loops

Losses within different asset classes—mortgages, mortgage-backed
securities, other asset-backed securities—can become highly correlated
for several reasons. First, financial losses on one asset can have spillover
effects and drag down the value of similar assets. For example, a
foreclosed home lowers the value of neighboring properties. Securities
that fall in price may drag down the prices of similar securities,
particularly when investors do not have adequate information to
distinguish how underlying risks may differ among securities. A lack of
distinguishing information may lead even rational investors to join a
sell-off. Prospects of a deep sell-off increase due to fear by individual
investors that other investors will sell.194
A second form of spillover effect occurs when losses do not stay in
the tidy boxes of risk categories outlined in Part I.A.i—credit risk,
market risk, liquidity risk, etc.195 Instead, losses that fall within one

Mortgage Financial Crisis 16 (Nov. 2008) (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn 2008/43), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1309442,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n192.pdf.
See also Coval et al., supra note 77, at 27–28.
193. Coval et al., supra note 77, at 10.
194. Mitchell Y. Abolafia & Martin Kilduff, Enacting Market Crisis: the Social Construction of a
Speculative Bubble, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 177 (1988). A sell-off need not be explained solely by
irrational panic driven by behavioral biases. Investors who sell off may be completely rational in
seeking to avoid losses driven by other investors selling in a panic. Information cascades may also
offer a partial explanation. Michael P. Dooley & Carl E. Walsh, Academic Views of Capital Flows:
an Expanding Universe, Reserve Bank of Australia Conference Volume, 89, 100 (1999), available
at http://www.rba.gov.au/publicationsandresearch/Conferences/1999/DooleyWalsh.pdf, permanent
copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n194.pdf.
195. Some scholars have argued that because one particular financial loss may qualify as both a
credit risk and market risk, models may therefore double-count risk and lead to overly conservative
risk management. Bhala, supra note 10, at 149–51.
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category of risk may spill over and trigger losses from an altogether
different form of risk. Consider the following characterization of the
spreading financial crisis described in Part I.C:
• Market risk triggers credit risk: An unexpected rise in
interest rates causes borrowers to default on obligations or
become insolvent. This causes their lenders and derivative
counterparties to realize credit risk.
• Credit risk triggers liquidity risk: The increased credit risk on
lenders and counterparties causes them to sell assets to
prevent a decline in their own creditworthiness. Market-wide
sell-offs of the same class of assets cause prices of those
assets to plummet and magnify liquidity risk.
• Liquidity risk feeds back into credit and market risk:
Plummeting prices from asset fire sales cause holders of those
assets to realize additional market risk. The inability of firms
to sell assets at historical market prices also deteriorates their
creditworthiness and increases the credit risk of their
creditors.
• The above risks compound reputation and systemic risk: A
financial institution’s deteriorating creditworthiness (or even
apparent deterioration among other firms) can cause a run on
the institution. Runs on multiple financial institutions worsen
systemic risk.
The foregoing example demonstrates that spillover effects may create
feedback loops. If rising interest rates increase mortgage defaults, which
cause larger losses to lenders, who consequently cut back on extending
new credit, then interest rates will rise further and provide more fuel to
the cycle.
Moreover, the foregoing example illustrates how spillover effects and
feedback loops can also transform credit risk and market risk into more
complex forms of risk, such as liquidity risk. In the current crisis, when
credit and market risk led to sufficient defaults in mortgages and assetbacked securities, owners of both foreclosed properties and asset-backed
securities struggled to find buyers for their assets.196 A loss of liquidity
caused markets and credit to seize up, making assets extremely difficult
to value and, in some cases, worthless.197

196. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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Yet liquidity risk can arise from complex interactions of market and
credit risk, including when one form of risk has spillover effects on
another or exacerbates the other through feedback loops. Accordingly, it
is extremely difficult to model liquidity risk, and the models have not
developed to anywhere near the extent of models for credit and market
risk. For similar reasons, systemic risk—the granddaddy of all risks—
also proves resistant to modeling.198 Risk models (and regulations) that
segregate risks into separate analytic categories of credit, market, and
other forms of risk can severely underestimate risk.199
Homogeneity among risk models exacerbates this problem as it
means models at different firms miss the same risks, creating universal
blind spots. As Part II.B.vi explains, homogenous risk models also
translate into homogenous risk-management practices, meaning that
investor reactions to market downturns will be highly synchronized,
thereby deepening market disruption.
v.

Interface Between Codes: Information Gaps

Assuming that originator models were highly robust and based on
correct information and extensive data, other financial institutions down
the securitization chain often lacked access to these models or their data.
Each separate stage in the securitization process creates information
gaps; as mortgages are transferred from borrower to originator to SIV to
investors, information on the risk of those mortgages is progressively
“destroyed.”200 As in a child’s game of “telephone,” the end investors of
a securitization receive poor information about the underlying assets.201
But even these investors have better information than their
counterparties in a credit default swap.
Investor and hedge counterparties alike may take an analytic shortcut
by relying on the ratings of rating agencies. Rating agencies also suffer

198. Andrew Haldane et al., Financial Stability and Bank Solvency, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL
CRISES: RESOLVING LARGE BANK INSOLVENCIES 83, 109–10 (Douglas D. Evanoff & George G.
Kaufman eds., 2005) (noting methodological challenges to measuring systemic risk).
199. Of course, some scholars argue that segregating risk into different types and different
models may lead to overestimation of risk because separate credit and market risk models may
overlap and capture the same losses—ultimately leading to double-counting and excessive capital
requirements. See Bhala, supra note 10, at 150–51. But this contention assumes that the separate
models capture the non-linear interactive effects of risks (or, more precisely, that the amount of
double-counting outweighs the amount of undercounting).
200. Buiter, supra note 134, at 3–4.
201. Id.
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from asymmetric information, however, and critics have been faulted for
a dismal performance in predicting credit problems.202 Part II.B.iv
explains how the incentives of originators and rating agencies
exacerbated the loss of information in the gaps between models.
vi.

Flaws in Modeling Human Behavior

1.

Bounded Rationality: The “Killer App” for Behavioral Law and
Economics

At its core, modeling financial risk faces the challenge of modeling
individual behavior. For example, securitization begins with models and
marketing code employed by originators to determine which loans
consumers will purchase, and when consumers will default. Further
down the chain, risk-management models employed by financial
institutions must factor in how other investors will buy and sell assetbacked securities to calculate market risk and liquidity risk. Modeling
behavior is greatly simplified by assuming individuals are rational
actors.
But behavioral economics has offered substantial empirical and
experimental evidence that the rationality of individuals is bounded.
Pioneering work in psychology demonstrated that individuals exhibit
various cognitive biases, such as overconfidence, over-optimism and the
availability bias, and employ heuristics to estimate probabilities.203
Consumer-law scholars have argued that these examples of bounded
rationality-lead consumers to make suboptimal borrowing choices and to
choose financial products that are not in their long-term self interest.204
Behavioral-finance scholars have posited that bounded rationality causes
investors to make suboptimal investment choices and leads to financialmarket failures.205 A subsequent wave of behavioral-economics
scholarship, particularly in behavioral finance, tied behavioral biases to
financial-market anomalies that cannot be squared with rational investor
behavior and market efficiency.206 In recent years, economists and legal
202. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 658–61.
203. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471
(1998).
204. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 63.
205. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
206. Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 1B HANDBOOK OF
THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1054, 1075–1105 (George M Constantinides et al. eds., 2003).
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scholars have explored the particular behavioral biases that affect
individuals in the real-estate and subprime-mortgage markets.207
Behavioral economics has faced trenchant criticisms. Notably,
Professor Gregory Mitchell208 has argued that behavioral economics
presents general tendencies, but has yet to delineate the boundaries of
those tendencies.209 In other words, behavioral economics produces
evidence that behavioral biases occur, but has not specified when those
biases occur.210 This failure to specify boundary conditions means that
behavioral economics struggles to produce models of human behavior
that can lead to testable predictions.211
This criticism can be flipped and applied not only to the modeling of
scholars, but also to the modeling used by financial institutions to
predict consumer and investor behavior. Prediction of human behavior
by financial modeling is frustrated by the lack of defined boundaries to
behavioral biases. This lack of definition obscures the thresholds and
magnitude of the effects of behavioral biases. Thus, the higher the
probability that a behavioral bias will be salient in a given context, the
more uncertainty it threatens to add to risk modeling. Demonstrating the
flaws in private industry risk models may prove the “killer
application”212 of behavioral economics.
Behavioral economics also argues for revisiting the work of consumer
law scholars such as Professors Warren, Bar-Gill, and Willis to
underscore a nuance in their arguments. When these scholars argue that

207. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts,
94 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009); Markus K. Brunnermeier & Christian Julliard, Money
Illusion and Housing Frenzies, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 135 (2008); Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership
2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008).
208. See Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in Behavioral
Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781 (2003) (arguing that behavioral law-and-economics
proponents have documented “tendencies” in behavioral biases, but have yet to specify the
“boundaries” of those tendencies, i.e., when, and the extent to which, these biases come into play);
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551,
1559–60 (1998) (faulting behavioral law-and-economics scholars for failing to offer a theory
capable of generating testable predictions that would rival the predictive power of rational-choice
economics).
209. Mitchell, supra note 208, at 1804–11.
210. Id.
211. Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not be Traded for
Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 122–23 (2002).
212. In its original computer-programming context, a “killer application” (or “killer app”) is a
piece of software, the popularity of which drives demand for the underlying platform on which the
software runs. STEVE JONES, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW MEDIA 172 (2003).
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data-mining and computer-based models allow financial institutions to
predict consumer defaults, they are writing of a relative information
advantage compared to consumers.213 The subprime crisis suggests that
originator models can also suffer severe flaws in predicting consumer
behavior. Severe losses and insolvencies experienced by originators due
to mortgages and mortgage-backed securities that they retained suggest
that mortgage originators did have an incentive to accurately model
consumer behavior, but that they severely miscalculated the level of
consumers defaulting on more complex mortgages.214
2.

Modeling and Complex Adaptive Systems

Even assuming the perfect rationality of individuals, models may fail
due to the inherent complexity of financial systems. Complexity science
is a somewhat amorphous interdisciplinary field in which economists,
computer scientists, and natural scientists study how simple interactions
between adaptive agents (which could mean anything from investors in a
market to organisms in an ecosystem to cells within an organism) can
evolve into increasingly complex adaptive systems.215 The ability of
agents to adapt to the changes in the system, including those caused by
the interaction of the agents, leads the overall system—the market,
ecosystem or organism—to develop in nonlinear ways.216
213. See supra notes 62–64, and accompanying text.
214. John Kiff & Paul S. Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in
U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets, (IMF Working Paper No. 07-188, 2007), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07188.pdf, permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n214.pdf.
215. Complex adaptive systems are systems in which multiple independent agents interact with
one another. The capacity of the agents to adapt to changes in the system causes the system to
evolve into progressively more complex forms and to change in a non-linear manner. Simon A.
Levin, Complex Adaptive Systems: Exploring the Known, Unknown and the Unknowable, 40 BULL.
AM. MATH. SOC’Y 3, 4 (2002) (defining complex adaptive systems).
216. Id. The complex interactions of agents on the micro level frustrate the prediction of changes
to the overall system due to a feature of complex adaptive systems called “emergence.” Emergence
has been defined as:
[T]he appearance of unforeseen qualities from the self-organizing interaction of large numbers
of objects, which cannot be understood through study of any one of the objects. The key to
emergence is understanding that the emergent behaviors of dynamical systems are high-level
patterns arising from the indescribably complex interaction of lower-level subsystems. Hence,
removing or otherwise changing any interacting component of the system potentially changes
the entire system since the interactions leading to the global emergent behaviors may no longer
be possible.
J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-And-Society System: A WakeUp Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 877–78
(1996) (internal quotations omitted).
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A financial market is a complex adaptive system217 and may therefore
exhibit nonlinear behavior218 and suffer bouts of disequilibrium and
unpredictable swings.219 Accordingly, models of market risk may suffer
spectacular failures.220
The logic of complexity science may have other applications to risk
modeling. Risk models and risk management cannot assume a static
view of the market. Even acting within a set of risk models and riskmanagement policies based on those models, individuals at financial
institutions have a strong incentive to look for innovative ways to
achieve abnormal returns.221 Individuals adapt to the behavior of other
players in the market. Individuals also adapt to the set of legal rules
designed to constrain their behavior. Their adaptive responses lead to
innovations in investment strategies and financial products, which adds
new complexities not considered by previous models to the market.222

217. See, e.g., Cars H. Hommes, Financial Markets as Nonlinear Adaptive Evolutionary Systems,
1 QUANTITATIVE FIN. 149 (2001).
218. Risk models or regulations that rely on linear causality falter when applied to complex
adaptive systems. Professor J.B. Ruhl has written extensively on the failures of law to manage nonlinear causality. See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How
to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 979
(1997) (criticizing environmental statutes for this flaw).
219. John Foster, From Simplistic to Complex Systems in Economics, 29 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON.
873 (2005). Many complex adaptive systems may tend towards disequilibrium because of the
concept of emergence (described supra note 216). Ruhl, supra note 218, at 990–91.
220. See generally Alejando Reveiz Herault & Sebastian Rojas, The Case for Active Management
from the Perspective of Complexity Theory, 495 Borradores de Economía, 11 (2008), available at
http://www.banrep.gov.co/docum/ftp/borra495.pdf,
permanent
copy
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n220.pdf. Cf. CARLO C. JAEGER ET AL.,
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND RATIONAL ACTION (2001). Legal scholars have analyzed how individuals
severely underestimate risk when confronted with complex adaptive systems. E.g., Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the Industry
Before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1724–26 (2006) (discussing accounting firms’
underestimation of their legal exposure); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks
to Chaotic Crashes, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994).
221. During asset-price booms, individuals also have a strong incentive to violate internal
controls and regulations. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth
and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 424–41 (2006) (analyzing how
dynamics of asset-price bubbles and other booms undermine incentives to comply with securities
regulation). Non-compliance with laws and other agency costs are discussed in Part II.B infra.
222. At the same time, rule-makers and regulators may also be adapting their behavior to meet
the adaptive behavior of players in the financial markets. Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu,
Incomplete Law — A Conceptual and Analytical Framework and its Application to the Evolution of
Financial Market Regulation, 35 J. INT’L L. & POL. 931 (2003). This adds yet another level of
complexity to modeling the behavior of consumers, investors and markets.
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One adaptive response is to game-risk models. For example, traders in
financial institutions can game-value-at-risk models through a practice
called “stuffing risk into the tails.” Under this practice, traders would
take “asymmetric risk positions,” i.e., make investments that should
average small gains, but have a small probability of very large losses.
These large losses lie in the “fat tail” of a loss curve and outside a valueat-risk measurement.223
B.

User Interface: Human Agency and Agency Costs

The failure of code to adequately model human behavior dovetails
with another failure of models in considering the human element.
Financial models and other code failed in the subprime crisis not only
because of problems with their internal assumptions or with modeling
human behavior, but also because of human error in applying the
models. The use of the term “code” does not imply that risk models are
self-executing. Human agents design, select, and implement models. But
along with human agency comes agency costs, as the individuals in
charge of designing, choosing, and implementing models can fail to take
sufficient care or act selfishly. Agency costs appear first in the design
and selection of models and second in how models are implemented.224
i.

Selecting Code: Model Fit or Fitting the Model?

Ideally, individuals who design or select risk and pricing models
should choose models based on their accuracy in measuring risk.
Instead, evidence suggests that individuals often choose models to
justify predetermined business strategies.225 This risk becomes
particularly acute in securitization when firms use a practice known as
“mark-to-model” to value underlying assets instead of using market
prices.226 This subversion of the risk-management process stems from
223. Nocera, supra note 163, at 46.
224. Regulators have increasingly paid attention to agency-cost theories of explaining rating
agency failures during the subprime crisis and have focused, in particular, on potential conflicts of
interest created by rating agencies receiving payment from the issuers, whose securities the agencies
are rating. See, e.g., July 2008 SEC Rating Agency Report, supra note 89, at 23–28, 31–32.
225. Neil Shah, Can Wall Street be Trusted to Value Risky CDOs?, REUTERS, July 13, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSN0929430320070713, permanent copy available
at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n225.pdf.
226. One real-estate holding company executive commented on the potentials for abuse with this
practice:
When you use a computer model, you’re going to see people make bad decisions . . . Sellers
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the pressure on individuals to justify riskier business strategies with
higher returns (which, in turn, may increase an individual’s
compensation).
This bias in selecting models might offer a partial explanation for
why the Basel II internal-model approach in the SEC’s CSE Program led
to investment banks dramatically increasing leverage227 and having
insufficient capital to weather a crisis.228 If an internal model suggested a
higher level of regulatory capital than a standard capital regulation (i.e.,
a regulation that does not allow a bank to use its internal models, but
instead applies categorical risk weights to bank assets), it is questionable
whether a financial institution would place itself at a competitive
disadvantage and follow the model.
ii.

Implementation Errors

Even if financial institutions select appropriate models in the abstract,
the individuals who write the computer code behind the risk model can
make errors. These bugs or implementation errors can propagate
themselves when models are copied, and can lead to serious mistakes in
computing risk. In 2008, press reports indicated that Moody’s blamed a
“bug” in some of its computer software for incorrect ratings of several
CDOs.229
iii.

Inputs to Code: Low-Documentation Loans

Once models have been designed and selected, they require human
beings to input information. At this input stage, individuals can subvert
the workings of the model by entering incorrect information. Without
accurate information, even well-designed models cannot adequately
gauge risk. Low-documentation loans—or mortgage loans that were lent
without lenders insisting on documentation of the borrower’s income or
were incentivized to say the assets were worth a lot, because they made a commission on sales.
Many fund managers charge fees in part based on the value of their assets, so they also had
incentives to say this stuff was worth a lot. It’s not impossible to choose models that support
the need for a high-value product.
Tully, supra note 150.
227. See Labaton, supra note 122 (describing increases in investment-bank leverage in wake of
CSE program).
228. Cf. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 122, at xi (recommending that SEC reassess
capital requirements in CSE Program in light of Bear Stearns collapse).
229. Sam Jones et al., Moody’s Error Gave Top Ratings to Debt Products, FIN. TIMES, May 21,
2008.
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employment230—enabled borrowers (or unscrupulous brokers) to supply
incorrect information (or no information at all) about income,
employment, and other information relevant to establishing a borrower’s
creditworthiness. By one estimate, more than fifty percent of subprime
loans issued over a two-year period ending in 2007 were made on the
basis of such limited documentation.231 These loans greatly increased the
credit risk of mortgages and, by extension, related mortgage-backed
securities. Consequently, these mortgages defaulted at much higher rates
than predicted by rating agency and securitization-pricing models and
caused the subprime crisis to mushroom.232
The problem of low-documentation loans was enabled by the fact that
originators did not insist on documentation, mainly because they
transferred the credit risk via securitization. This underscores the need to
focus not only on the technical aspects of code, but also on the
incentives of actors in designing, inputting data, and using code.
iv.

Gaming the Models

As noted above, individuals at financial institutions can also game
models by making risky investments designed specifically to avoid
detection by the models.233
v.

Interface between Codes Revisited: Information Destruction &
Information Externalities

The problem of low-documentation loans points to a larger problem:
different institutions in the securitization and hedging chain may have
insufficient incentive to share information they have on the credit risks
and other risks with institutions down the chain. Moreover, these
institutions have little incentive to share operations of their risk models
with one another.234
This lack of information sharing is suboptimal, as explained by the
following discussion of the economic externalities involved with risk
modeling. Like risk management in general, the use of effective risk
230. Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MO. L. REV. 1031,
1046 (2007).
231. Alan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How Did It Happen and How Will It
End?, 13 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 13 (2007) (discussing data for “past two years”).
232. E. Scott Reckard, Adjustable Loans Spur New Worries, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, at A1.
233. Nocera, supra note 163, at 46.
234. See Buiter, supra note 134.
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modeling creates positive externalities. A firm that mitigates its own risk
reduces credit risk for its creditors.235 Similarly, systemic risk can be
reduced effectively only if institutions throughout the financial system
make adequate risk-management decisions. Otherwise, the system is
susceptible to domino effects as one institutional failure could cause
cascading failures of other firms due to counterparty and reputation
risk.236 Furthermore, providing information about a firm’s risk models
has positive externalities because it allows counterparties and the market
as a whole to better evaluate credit risks posed by the firm.237
Yet firms have disincentives to provide full disclosure about their risk
modeling (aside from the fact that they cannot fully capture the benefits
of an externality). Detailed information on a firm’s risk modeling would
allow other firms both to adopt copycat models (and thus free ride on the
investment made in constructing the model), and to profit by trading
against the firm by reverse-engineering the firm’s trading strategies.
On the other hand, incomplete information on a counterparty’s risk
models reduces the ability of a firm to gather information needed to
assess its own credit risk. Moreover, incomplete information may create
a lemons problem;238 if investors or counterparties cannot distinguish
firms with good risk models from those with poor ones, even firms with
solid models may be assumed to pose excessive credit and systemic risks
and may find it difficult to escape the contagion of latter day bank
runs.239 Competent regulators can provide some certification as to the
235. The positive externality becomes clearer when considered in reverse; the financial failure of
a firm imposes negative externalities. See GARRY J. SCHINASI, SAFEGUARDING FINANCIAL
STABILITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 48–50 (2006).
236. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 39 (positing that because of positive externalities, individual firms
have insufficient incentives to mitigate systemic risk).
237. See SCHINASI, supra note 235, at 49 (discussing information as positive externality).
238. The “lemons problem” describes how markets can unravel when there are a number of
products of varying quality in a marketplace, but consumers cannot distinguish the high-quality
products that are more costly to produce (for example, good cars or financial institutions with good
risk-management practices) from inferior products produced at lower cost (for example, “lemon”
cars or firms with bad risk-management policies). When this situation occurs, consumers will
discount the price they are willing to pay for a product and will pay the price for what they perceive
to be an average-quality good. This average price will mean sellers of high-quality products will not
receive the full value for their products. Many will decide to exit the market (or perhaps produce
shoddier, lower-cost products). This will drive the average quality of the product in the marketplace
down. This drop in average quality will lead consumers to further discount price, leading above
average producers to exit. This creates a vicious cycle. For the seminal work on the lemons
problem, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
239. Cf. Guillermo Calvo, Author’s Remarks, WANTED: WORLD FINANCIAL STABILITY 57
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quality of risk modeling, but the failure of regulators to inspect risk
models in any depth devalues this certification.
vi.

The Risk of Homogeneity Among Risk Models: An AntiCoordination Problem

Even if regulators competently evaluate individual risk models, the
interaction of the risk models of different firms creates anti-coordination
problems.240 Too much homogeneity among risk-management strategies
of financial institutions can increase systemic risk.241 If firms have the
same strategies and similar portfolios, market shocks can cause the firms
to sell the same types of assets at the same time to cover their
positions.242 A widespread sell-off would cause values of these assets to
plummet and trigger a sell-off of yet another class of assets.243
Homogeneity of risk management and models can thus lead to spiraling
market declines.244 There has been some concern that this is already
occurring in the subprime crisis; prices of certain less risky assets have
plummeted, as financial firms sell off “good assets” to cover their losses
on the “bad.”245 This homogeneity in risk modeling mirrors the risks
posed by homogeneity in completely different kinds of systems; for
example, homogeneous computer systems are more prone to viruses and
security breaches.246
(Eduardo Fernandez-Arias & Ricardo Hausmann eds., 2000) (characterizing cross-border financial
contagion, in which financial crises spurred by one sovereign’s default spread to other nations, as a
lemon problem).
240. An anti-coordination game is a game in which players adopting the same strategies create
losses for all the players. For a more technical definition, see Fuhito Kojima & Satoru Takahashi,
Anti-coordination Games and Dynamic Stability, 9 INT’L GAME THEORY REV. 667, 668–69 (2007).
241. Carol Alexander, The Present and Future of Risk Management, 3 J. FIN. ECONOMETRICS 3
(2005) (positing that regulation may perversely create this homogeneity).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. The risk posed by homogeneity points to a need for financial institutions and regulators
to focus on a second kind of portfolio diversification; each institution needs to analyze not only
whether its own portfolio is sufficiently diversified among asset classes, but also whether its
portfolio is sufficiently differentiated from the portfolios of other firms in the market.
245. See, e.g., Steven Pearlstein, Missed Opportunities, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2007, available at
2007 WLNR 15269893.
246. See Rainer Bohme, Cyber-Insurance Revisited (2005) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www1.inf.tu-dresden.de/~rb21/publications/Boehme2005_CyberInsurance_Revisited_
WEIS.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/
84washlrev127n246a.pdf; Rainer Bohme & Gaurav Kataria, Models and Measures for Correlation
in Cyber-Insurance (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://www1.inf.tu-dresden.de/~rb21/
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Homogeneity of risk models and risk-management practices has
several causes. First, the education of quantitative-finance experts in
business schools and economics department can lead to orthodoxies in
risk modeling.247 Second, there is a wide literature on herd behavior and
mimicry in financial markets.248 If herd behavior leads firms to invest in
the same types of assets and firms adjust risk modeling to justify their
investment decisions, risk models will tend to converge. Less cynically,
if firms find a risk model that gives them a competitive advantage, firms
that do not seek to imitate that model may be at a competitive
disadvantage. Moreover, widespread reliance on rating agency ratings
can create this homogeneity.249
Even disciplined firms that are worried about homogeneity in risk
modeling will struggle to ensure that their models are sufficiently
different from those of other firms. Without information on the modeling
practices of other firms, the anti-coordination problem posed by
homogenous modeling is difficult to solve.
vii. A Coordination Problem Among National Regulators
In contrast to anti-coordination problems, regulators in different
countries face a coordination problem with risk modeling. Under Basel
II, banking regulators in each nation have substantial discretion over the
extent to which capital requirements may be set according to either
internal financial institution models or rating agency ratings. This
flexibility permits national bank regulators to refrain (or forbear) from
stringently examining and regulating the models used by home-country
banks and rating agencies. These banks and rating agencies may press
their regulators for lenient treatment in order to take on more risk and
make more profit. Yet it is in the collective interest of national regulators
to coordinate the level of their regulation—including their level of

publications/BK2006_Correlation_CyberInsurance_WEIS.pdf, permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n246b.pdf.
247. Cf. Nocera, supra note 163; Felix Salmon, Recipe for Disaster: The Formula that Killed
Wall Street, WIRED, Feb. 23, 2009, at 74.
248. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 135–68 (2000).
249. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Statement No. 257: Reliance on Third-Party
Credit Ratings 1 (Feb. 11, 2008), available at http://www.aei.org/research/shadow/projectID.
15/default.asp, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/
84washlrev127n249.pdf (asserting that widespread use of credit rating models by financial
institutions is problematic because the “use of common models is a key source of systemic risk as
they are likely to err in the same direction).
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enforcement—to ameliorate systemic risk.250
III. SELECT POLICY AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
Part II examined several factors that contributed to the failure of the
new financial code and, consequently, exacerbated the subprime crisis.
This final part considers several implications of that analysis for policy
and legal scholarship.
Five general points frame the discussion of implications and
reverberate throughout Part III. First, law must not defer to the new
financial code uncritically. Regulators cannot outsource oversight—
whether over consumer lending or over risks posed to financial
institutions and global capital markets—to risk models and other codes
without thoroughly and continuously auditing those codes. Second, this
auditing requires both technical expertise and a constant critical
examination of technical assumptions. Regulators cannot abdicate
responsibility to examine codes because they are embedded in a complex
technology or involve elegant economic models. Third, the best codes
are worthless when paired with bad incentives. Codes are designed and
used by human agents, which creates agency costs. Codes can only lead
to effective risk management with incentive structures that address these
agency costs. Fourth, the complexity of code highlights the value of
simplicity in the design of both financial instruments and regulation. As
engineers have come to realize, sometimes simple designs are the best
solutions to complex risks.251 Finally, promoting transparency or
“openness” in the new financial code promotes efficiency and as well as
other normative interests.
A.

Scrapping Basel II’s Internal Models Approach

All five of these general points argue in favor of scrapping those
provisions in the Basel II Accord that allow banks to set any capital
requirements according to their internal models252 (which this Article
collectively refers to as the “Internal Models Approach”).253 The
250. This coordination problem was the very reason for the first Basel Accord. See supra note 13.
251. Henry Petroski has popularized the benefits of simplicity in response to engineering
problems. See, e.g., HENRY PETROSKI, INVENTION BY DESIGN: HOW ENGINEERS GET FROM
THOUGHT TO THING (1996).
252. See supra Part I.B.iii.3.
253. This term thus captures the Internal-Ratings Based Approach for credit risk (supra note
115), the Internal Models Approach for market risk (supra note 116) and the Advanced
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spectacular failure of the proprietary risk models of financial institutions
to predict or adequately protect against the current crisis makes
entrusting the proprietary risk models of banks with the responsibility of
setting regulatory capital seem dangerously misguided. In particular, the
dismal record of the Internal Models Approach in the SEC’s CSE
Program254 provides a warning to U.S. bank regulators to reverse and
shelve recent regulations that implement Basel II’s Internal RatingBased Approach.255 Moreover, international bank regulators responsible
for the Basel II Accord should revisit the Accord and excise the Internal
Models Approach provisions and return to the methods of Basel I for
setting regulatory capital.
Basel II should be reversed quickly before it is fully implemented.
The SEC’s application of the Internal Models Approach led to a
disastrous reduction in capital by investment banks.256 Now, because of
the ongoing financial crisis, many of those U.S. investment banks have
been bought by or converted into commercial banks.257 According to
economic studies, Basel II will also lead to undercapitalization when
applied to commercial banks.258
Although bank regulators could revise the Internal Models Approach
to provide more guidance to national bank regulators on auditing the
internal models of banks (as the staff at the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision has already done),259 the fundamental flaws of the Internal
Models Approach cannot be overcome. More detailed audit standards
would increase the compliance costs to the regulated banks. At the same
time, specific rules run the risk of becoming quickly obsolete due to the
constant change and increasing complexity of both private industry
modeling and financial products.260 Highly specific rules on model
standards would also need to be constantly rewritten to address attempts
Measurement Approach for operational risk (supra note 117).
254. See supra notes 126–127, 164 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 15, at 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288.
256. Supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.
257. Steven Sloan, Can Even Fed Oversight Alter Investment Banking Giants?, AMER. BANKER,
Feb. 2, 2009.
258. Supra note 120.
259. See, e.g., BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REVISIONS TO THE BASEL II
MARKET RISK FRAMEWORK (Jan. 2009).
260. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Statement No. 238: Basel II: One-and-a-Half
Cheers for the Standardized Approach 3 (Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://www.aei.org/research/
shadow/projectID.15/default.asp, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/
wlr/notes/84washlrev127n260.pdf.
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by financial institutions to game the rules.
More detailed rules would also increase the workload of regulators,
and financial regulators lack the capacity and incentives to enforce even
existing rules. Reviewing the numerous risk models of any one financial
institution, let alone back-testing and stress-testing a sample of those
models, would require enormous regulator manpower. Regulators
responsible for reviewing multiple firms but who are strapped for
resources have an incentive to be less rigorous in examining any one
firm. Auditing complex models also requires that regulators maintain
sufficient technical expertise. Yet regulators face a perpetual
disadvantage as the private sector continues to generate technical
innovations in financial instruments and modeling.
Even armed with sufficient resources, national bank regulators often
lack incentives to audit risk models vigorously. As noted in Part II.B.vii,
bank regulators worry whether their foreign counterparts are forbearing
from taking regulatory action so as to give their home-country banks a
competitive advantage in the international marketplace. Again, this
problem was one of the impetuses for the first Basel Accord.
The Basel II Accord makes policing the actions or inaction of
regulators even more difficult because of its complexity and lack of
transparency. Basel II contains the worst of both rules and standards. It
gives national regulators a wide measure of discretion in deciding which
banks may use internal models and whether those models satisfy the
Accord’s standards.261 Primary regulatory responsibility can be
outsourced to opaque, proprietary models of financial institutions. It is
then difficult to assess how thoroughly regulators are auditing these
models.262
Although imperfect, the simpler rules of Basel I have numerous
comparative advantages. They are easier to understand, facilitating
compliance by banks and auditing by regulators. They are also much
more transparent; it is easier not only for regulators to audit a bank, but
also for competitors of that bank and regulators in other countries to
check whether the bank was cheating (and whether its regulator was
adequately performing its job).263 Furthermore, simpler rules mean that
counterparties of banks can more easily understand and model the credit
risks posed by banks.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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B.

Promoting Open Source Risk Models

Assuming that Basel II is not repealed, a second-best policy
alternative would be to require that banks seeking to use internal risk
models for setting their capital requirements publicly disclose the details
of those risk models.
i.

The Outlines of an Open-Source Approach

The disclosure approach to fixing Basel II draws on some of the
concepts and arguments that support the open source movement in
software.264 Open source software can have different meanings, but a
core element of the concept is that the source code265 of the software is
openly disclosed.266
This Article’s proposal builds on this disclosure element of open
source. (Another key element to the definition of open source is that
open-source software must be licensed to the public; the license must
allow other individuals to use and copy the source code freely and to
modify the source code for their own use or for creating derivative
software.267 These aspects of open source software are less essential to
this paper’s proposal.) Here is how disclosure could work with respect to
Basel II. Institutions would not be obligated to disclose the internal
working of their models; disclosure would be merely a condition of use
of these risk models for purposes of setting regulatory capital. In
264. Lawrence Lessig has argued that the transparency of open-source software allows the public
to understand and counteract the ways in which internet code allows the private sector and the
government to regulate social use of the internet. As noted in the Introduction to this Article, there
are parallels between how internet architecture functions as a regulatory code (per Lessig) and how
private risk models now function as a new form of financial regulation. See supra notes 22–25 and
accompanying text.
Lessig’s open proposal for checking the regulatory power of internet code has a parallel in this
paper’s proposal for checking the new financial code. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
265. Source code of software is the text, written in a programming language that is readable to
humans and that converts human instructions into computer executions. Apple Public Source
License Version 2.0 (Aug. 6, 2003), available at http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n265.pdf.
266. See Open Source Initiative, Open Source Definition (July 7, 2006), http://opensource.org/
docs/osd, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev
127n266a.pdf. The Open Source Initiative is a non-profit organization that promotes open source
concepts in software, acts as “steward” of the Open Source Definition, and certifies whether
software licenses comply with the standards in the Open Source Definition. Open Source Initiative,
About the Open Source Initiative (Sept. 19, 2006), http://opensource.org/about, permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n266b.pdf.
267. See id.
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exchange for this right, institutions would be required to disclose the
assumptions, structures, and algorithms used in their models.
To back-test models thoroughly (for the reasons described below),
outsiders would also need information about the historic investment
portfolio of the financial institution. In addition, gauging the
effectiveness of risk models going forward would require some
information about the institution’s current portfolio, but quite a bit of
information on the portfolios of large publicly traded financial
institutions is already publicly available online through securities
filings.268
ii.

The Benefits of Open Source

Using a disclosure-based, open-source inspired approach to fix Basel
II would have multiple benefits. First, public disclosure would promote a
transparency in risk modeling that would enable the private sector to
audit a financial institution’s risk modeling. With greater transparency,
counterparties could evaluate the adequacy of a financial institution’s
risk management to assess their own counterparty/credit risk. Opening
the source code of risk models would thus mitigate information gaps
between the models of different financial institutions, as the
counterparties of any bank would better understand the bank’s basis for
its risk management.269
Public disclosure would also allow an institution’s competitors to
double-check the work of regulators. Competitors could police whether
an institution is “cheating” and adopting weak models to justify taking
on additional levels of risk for competitive advantage.270 Policing by a

268. More nuanced and more frequent disclosure (perhaps even close to real-time disclosure) of
portfolio information might be facilitated by a recent U.S. securities-disclosure initiative. The
XBRL program requires that certain securities issuers present financial data in XBRL format (a
special standard for business-related computer files that allows for easy sharing of files among
different software applications). This format would facilitate easier uploading of financial
disclosures straight from the information systems of a securities issuer to the web and easier
downloading of that disclosure by web users straight into analytical software programs. Final Rule:
XBRL Voluntary Financial Reporting on the EDGAR System, Securities Act Release No. 33-8,529,
Exchange Act Release, 34–51,129, 70 Fed. Reg. 6,556 (Feb. 3, 2005).
Commentators have already lauded the potential of the XBRL Rule to increase transparency in
financial markets and allow an “army of citizen regulators” to police risk in financial markets.
Daniel Roth, Road Map for Financial Recovery: Radical Transparency Now!, WIRED, Feb. 23,
2009, at 81.
269. See supra Parts II.A.v and II.B.v.
270. See supra Part II.B.vii.
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bank’s or regulator’s competitors would mitigate the problem of
regulatory forbearance. Unlike regulators, both counterparties and
competitors would have a strong natural incentive to audit a financial
institution’s risk models thoroughly. Unlike regulators, private auditors
would also have sufficient technical expertise.
Another benefit to open-source financial code is that greater
disclosure would likely generate more robust financial models—i.e.,
models with fewer faulty assumptions or otherwise with a lower degree
of model risk error. Scholarship in computer science provides evidence
that open-source software code is less prone to bugs because open code
allows many minds to tackle debugging.271
The transparency of open source would help individual financial
institutions solve the anti-coordination problems posed by homogenous
risk models.272 Even non-banks (which are not subject to Basel II)
worried about homogeneity could adjust their own risk models after
reviewing open source models.
iii.

Potential Drawbacks: Would Open Source Promote Homogeneity?

Opening the source code of financial models faces some potential
drawbacks. First, financial institutions would fear surrendering increased
profits from proprietary risk models (or even enabling others armed with
knowledge of the institution’s risk models to trade against them).273 But
this drawback is addressed by the elegance of making opening source
code optional. Banks are free to develop their proprietary models. But if
they want to use those models to set regulatory capital under Basel II,
they must disclose. This might create a powerful disincentive to take
advantage of Basel II and use proprietary models to set capital
requirements, but this disincentive may be justified given the serious
flaws outlined in Part III.A of Basel II’s reliance on internal models.
There is a second drawback to the open-source approach; full
disclosure of risk models would allow competitors to copy a bank’s risk
models and imitate their risk-management strategies. This could lead to
greater homogeneity in risk-modeling and risk management practices,

271. James W. Paulson et al., An Empirical Study of Open-Source and Closed-Source Software
Products, 30 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 246, 252–54 (2004) (finding
empirical support for fewer design defects in open-source software than closed-source).
272. See supra Part II.B.vi.
273. Another possible, related concern is that dampening the profit motivation to develop risk
models might also dampen valuable innovation in risk management.
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which, as Part II.B.vi explains, could increase systemic risk.274 This
concern is quite valid, but, on the other hand, there is already a large risk
of homogeneity in proprietary risk modeling.275 In fact, the risk of
homogeneity is heightened under the proprietary approach. Because
proprietary models are not publicly disclosed, it is difficult to understand
the scope of the current risk. This lack of transparency prevents financial
institutions from assessing the risk of whether their internal risk
modeling and management are too similar to those of other institutions,
raising the anti-coordination problem discussed in Part II.B.vii.
Regulators may have access to information about the modeling of
different financial institutions, but lack the resources to measure the
degree of homogeneity between models adequately. By contrast, greater
disclosure of models would allow individual financial institutions, as
well as scholars and private watchdogs, to assess thoroughly the risk of
homogeneity and raise alarms of increased systemic risk.
iv.

Extending the Open-Source Approach

Indeed, to understand the value and risk (including systemic risk) of
complex assets, such as asset-backed securities, the marketplace would
need greater information about the risk models used by earlier
institutions in the chain of securitization. Otherwise, flaws in any model
in any link of the long securitization chain (in which mortgages are used
to create mortgage-backed securities, which are then used to back CDOs,
which then are used to create “CDOs-squared” which are then hedged
with credit default swaps) snowball into greater model errors later in the
chain.276
Therefore, there is great value in extending the open-source approach
all the way back to the data-mining software used to price and structure
original consumer mortgages. But encouraging open source of this
broader array of risk models would need a different policy lever than the
approach outlined above, i.e., using Basel II and the ability to “set your
own” capital requirements as a carrot to promote disclosure of models.
In short, some degree of regulation would be necessary to require
disclosure of the inner workings of those models that are used to price
274. There may be some precedent for open source leading to homogeneity. J.P. Morgan first
developed value-at-risk models and then allowed other firms to copy the models, which became an
industry standard. Nocera, supra note 163, at 33.
275. Supra Part II.B.vi.
276. Supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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asset-backed securities or derivatives.
This extension of the open source approach would have all of the
potential efficiency gains outlined above: allowing counterparties and
the financial markets to assess the quality of particular firms’ risk
models, addressing information gaps between models in the chain of
securitization and hedging, promoting better, more robust models by
allowing many minds to tackle “debugging,” and allowing firms to
evaluate the risk of excessive homogeneity in modeling.
v.

Open Source and Rating Agencies

One set of private-industry models, those of rating agencies, would
particularly benefit from the open-source approach. Many commentators
have noted the dismal track record of rating agencies, particularly with
respect to asset-backed securities; there has been a shocking level of
default among classes of asset-backed securities with high ratings.277 A
full discussion of the potential reasons behind the poor performance of
rating agencies is beyond the scope of this Article. But it is clear that
either rating agencies are using flawed models to assess the risk of assetbacked securities or they are failing to follow these models when issuing
ratings.
In February 2009, the SEC proposed regulations to require that rating
agencies disclose certain performance data including statistics tracking
the default rates on securities rated by the rating agency.278 This
regulation does not go far enough. The SEC should require that
registered rating agencies, NRSROs, fully disclose the “source code” of
every model (including algorithms and assumptions) used to rate
securities. This would allow regulators and investors to assess and
troubleshoot flaws in the models used by the rating agencies. The
voluntary disclosure made by rating agencies to date, including Standard
& Poor’s releasing a CDO Calculator,279 does not provide sufficient
data.

277. Michel Crouhy et al., The Subprime Credit Crisis of 07 (July 9, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1112467, permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n277.pdf.
278. Re-Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange
Act Release No. 34–59,343, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,485 (Feb. 9, 2009).
279. See Standard & Poor’s CDO Interface, http://www.sp.cdointerface.com/CdoOnlineWeb/
login.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009), permanent copy as site appeared on June 2, 2009, available
at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n279.pdf.
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Disclosure would not place the NRSROs at a grave competitive
disadvantage because of the oligopoly position they enjoy. Again, they
enjoy this oligopoly position not only because of the SEC license they
hold, but also because myriad financial regulations (including Basel II)
place restrictions on financial institutions holding securities other than
“investment grade”; these restrictions create a demand for investmentgrade securities and for ratings from NRSROs.280
vi.

Open Source and Consumer Protection

The open-source model should extend all the way back to the datamining and credit-scoring software that lenders use to design and market
consumer financial products. The Federal Reserve Board recently
proposed amendments to Regulation Z (which implements Truth in
Lending Act provisions) to improve disclosures to consumers of credit
card terms.281 Regulation Z and similar regulations could be used to
mandate public disclosure by lenders of their data-mining and creditscoring software and risk models.
Opening the source code of these risk models would allow purchasers
of asset-backed securities that are ultimately backed by consumer
financial products to gauge the quality of the risk modeling that prices
the risk of these products. But opening this source code would have
several benefits to consumers as well. First, transparency in data-mining
and credit-scoring software would allow consumers to see how financial
products transfer risks from financial institutions to consumers. For
example, consumers could evaluate risk models used to price adjustablerate mortgages to determine the extent to which the lender is passing on
market risk of interest-rate increases back to borrowers. Similarly,
consumers could benefit from access to models used by credit card
companies determining which customers should receive complex
penalty provisions in their credit card contracts.282 Greater consumer
information would allow consumers to detect when lenders are taking
advantage of information asymmetries or consumer behavioral biases to
280. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text. Incidentally, these financial regulations that
piggyback on NRSRO ratings may provide another lever to open the source code of rating agencies.
If the SEC fails to require that rating agencies open the source code of their models as a condition to
NRSRO status, these financial regulations could be amended to specify that acceptable “investment
grade” securities would only mean securities given an “investment grade rating” by an NRSRO that
has opened the source code of the model used to give the rating.
281. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,866 (May 19, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
282. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 58.
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extract greater value from consumers.283
Of course, consumers might not be able to make much use of
disclosure of data-mining and credit-scoring software by themselves.
But, as Professors Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein recently noted in
applauding the Federal Reserve’s proposed rules, third parties could
audit these disclosures for consumers, alerting them to excessively risky
provisions.284 Moreover, consumer watchdog groups could inspect datamining and credit-scoring software for other concerns, including
whether individual privacy is being infringed upon (which is a concern
of Professor Lessig with respect to internet code),285 and whether lenders
are engaging in subtle racial or other discriminatory lending practices.
C.

In Praise of Equity

The failures of the new financial code outlined in this Article urge
rethinking the growth of asset-backed securities and derivatives at the
expense of markets for equity securities. The failures of the risk models
used to price asset-backed securities and derivatives indicate that equity
securities may enjoy some comparative advantage in providing a
cushion against risk.
A recent article by Professors Gilson and Whitehead mapped out the
decline of equity markets due to the increasing popularity of complex
financial instruments.286 The article noted that these instruments,
including securitizations and credit derivatives, enable companies to
reduce their cost of capital by disaggregating the residual risk
traditionally borne by shareholders; companies can then offload these
risks to more efficient risk bearers.287 Derivatives, securitization, and
insurance policies separate out specific risks faced by companies, and
allow these firms to contract with third parties to assume the distilled
risk. Professors Gilson and Whitehead have persuasively argued that
growth of asset-backed securities and derivatives have sapped equity
markets, as companies now have cheaper options to pass on residual

283. See supra notes 58–65, 67–68 and accompanying text.
284. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Disclosure is the Best Kind of Credit Regulation,
WALL. ST. J., Aug. 13, 2008, at A17.
285. Lessig, supra note 22, at 142.
286. See Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 1.
287. Id. (positing that derivatives, securitizations and similar novel financial products allow
companies to sell their residual risk to more efficient risk bearers than equity investors and thus
reduce issuer demand for equity markets).
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risk.288
In pricing these instruments, companies rely on the same types of
codes that failed in the subprime crisis. The failures of these codes—
whether stemming from model risk, information gaps, agency costs, or
something else—call into question just how efficiently these novel
financial products distill, allocate, and spread risk. In particular, many
models for pricing asset-backed securities were unable to process the
cocktail of different forms of risk; as noted in Part II.A.iv above,
spillover and feedback effects between different forms of risk frustrate
risk modeling. Equity holders who bear undivided residual risk have
many comparative advantages as risk bearers; they bear residual risk, no
matter whether the source is credit, market or liquidity risk or some
cocktail of the three.
Equity has other advantages for issuers. First, derivatives, options,
and debt instruments allow counterparties to transfer or terminate their
bearing of risk through the use of assignment provisions, margin calls
and redemption provisions. By contrast, equity has the virtue of being
what banking scholars call “patient capital.”289 Capital raised through
equity is locked into a company for a longer time, increasing its capacity
to absorb risk.
Second, unlike credit derivatives, asset-backed securities and
insurance policies, equity securities do not require companies to assess
the credit risk of their counterparties. By contrast, the disconnect and
distance between the financial instrument and the underlying cashproducing assets in derivatives and other complex financial instruments
complicates the assessment of credit risk; recall the long chain from
mortgages to mortgage-backed securities to CDOs to credit default
swaps.290 Lastly, the complex structure of derivatives and the complex
financial modeling used to price them resist easy understanding. As with
consumer mortgages and banking rules, complexity in financial devices
may thus exacerbate systemic risk.
These points do not contradict the descriptive claim made by
Professors Gilson and Whitehead that companies have taken advantage
of the completion of capital markets to shift risk using non-equity
instruments. Perhaps the problems with asset-backed securities in the
288. Id.
289. Richard A. Brealey, Bank Capital Requirements and the Control of Bank Failure, in
FINANCIAL STABILITY AND CENTRAL BANKS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 149 (Richard A. Brealey et
al. eds., 2001).
290. Supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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subprime crisis will stem this shift in liquidity away from equity
markets,291 but that may be a temporary phenomenon. Yet the flaws in
modeling complex financial instruments may prove longer lasting. The
brief sketch of the comparative advantages of equity securities argues for
further study of the circumstances when shareholders may prove to be
the most efficient bearers of residual risk after all. If equity’s advantages
are significant but equity markets are underused due to market
imperfections, scholars and policy makers should consider policies to
channel issuers and investors back to equity markets.
CONCLUSION
Sophisticated risk models produced by advances in quantitative
finance had great promise in allowing financial institutions to measure
and manage risk. These models enabled the growth of complex financial
instruments—from mortgage-backed securities, to CDOs, to credit
default swaps—that allowed financial risk to be transferred and spread to
those parties in the economy who theoretically could bear that risk most
efficiently. These products lowered the cost of borrowing for consumers
and the cost of capital for financial institutions.
Dazzled by the promise of these risk models, financial regulators
delegated to them broad authority for regulating risk in the economy.
Regulators entrusted private-sector risk models with the duty to manage
risk born not only by consumers and financial institutions, but the risk to
the entire economy. Private-sector risk models thus became a “new
financial code” that displaced traditional legal codes for regulating
financial risk.
The severity of the current financial crisis underscored that faith in
the new financial code had been misplaced. Consumer borrowers,
financial institutions, and financial institutions’ creditors and investors
have all paid a terrible price for the failure of this code, as have
taxpayers, investors at large, workers, and those future generations who
face an increased national debt.
This Article unpacked the flaws in the new financial code, including
flaws in its internal design and flaws in the incentives of the firms and
individuals who used the code. These two types of flaws point to a
critical need to reexamine and roll back the outsourcing of financial

291. Professors Gilson and Whitehead believe that the subprime crisis will only slow the shift in
liquidity towards these complex instruments temporarily. See Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 1.
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regulation to the new financial code—for example, by jettisoning the
Internal Models Approach of Basel II. These two types of flaws also
point to a need for greater transparency in the new financial code; this
Article proposed harnessing the power of the open-source movement in
software to improve both financial-institution risk models and the
incentives of those who use them.
These two types of flaws also argue for greater engagement by
lawyers and legal scholars with the machinery of risk modeling for three
reasons. First, as with internet code, lawyers and legal scholars must also
engage technical aspects of the new financial code, because these
technical details can shift massive amounts of risk or even magnify risk.
Second, the new financial code has come to serve as de facto regulation
of a vast swath of consumer finance, banking, and capital markets.
Third, lawyers and legal scholars can play an invaluable role in
designing the incentives of the individuals and firms that use risk
models. They must play that role; lawyers and legal scholars bring a
needed perspective on how seemingly mechanical rules, when applied
and interpreted by human agents, can be manipulated in ways
unanticipated by those with an engineering mindset.
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